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1. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 555 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
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Justice Black warned in 1952 about the dangers of giving immigration
police and prosecutors the authority to jail human beings with very little
involvement by the judiciary. Today’s immigration detention machine
illustrates Justice Black’s fears: U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) agents have both arrested 182,869 people in a single year2 and
decided whether those individuals will be released or remain incarcerated for
the remainder of their removal proceedings. For those entitled to
immigration judge review, the judge works for the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) under the supervision of the Attorney General, the nation’s top
prosecutor.3 Immigration judges’ lack of independence has long been a
subject of critique,4 leading some to refer to themselves as “‘U.S. imitation

2. U.S. IMMGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2020 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL
OPERATIONS REPORT 7, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports/annual-report/eroReport
FY2020.pdf; U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2019 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL
OPERATIONS REPORT 5 https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2019/
eroReportFY2019.pdf (reporting that DHS agents arrested 510,854 people in fiscal year 2019).
3. Organizational Chart, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart (last
visited May 2, 2021); About the Office, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office
(last visited May 2, 2021).
4. See, e.g., Mary Holper, The Fourth Amendment Implications of “U.S. Imitation Judges”,
104 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (2020); Joint Letter from Am. Bar Ass’n, Am. Immigr. Laws. Ass’n,
Fed. Bar Ass’n, and Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. Judges to Congress (July 11, 2019),
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/7-11-joint-letter-1.pdf [hereinafter Joint Letter] (calling on
Congress to “establish an immigration court system that is independent of the U.S. Department of
Justice”); Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreaching in Immigration Adjudication, 93 TUL. L. REV.
707, 760–76 (2019); Amit Jain, Bureaucrats in Robes: Immigration “Judges” and the Trappings of
“Courts”, 33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 261, 309 (2019); TESS HELLGREN, ET AL., INNOVATION L. LAB &
S. POVERTY L. CTR., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S JUDGES: HOW THE U.S. IMMIGRATION COURTS
BECAME A DEPORTATION TOOL (June 2019), https://innovationlawlab.org/media/
COM_PolicyReport_The-Attorney-Generals-Judges_FINAL.pdf; Strengthening and Reforming
America’s Immigration Court System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border Sec. & Immigr. of
the S. Judiciary Comm., 115th Cong. 7 (2018) (statement of J. A. Ashley Tabaddor, President, Nat’l
Ass’n
of
Immigr.
Judges),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/04-1818%20Tabaddor%20Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Tabaddor]; Hon. Denise Noonan Slavin & Hon.
Dana Leigh Marks, Conflicting Roles of Immigration Judges: Do You Want Your Case Heard by a
“Government Attorney” or by a “Judge”?, 16 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1785, 1788–90 (2011);
AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N IMMIGR., REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM (2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/coi_co
mplete_full_report.pdf; Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE
L.J. 1635, 1644 (2010); Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an
Article I Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 3–4, 10–11 (2008); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 369–70 (2006);
Peter J. Levinson, The Façade of Quasi-Judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate
Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1164 (2004); U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGR.
REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT POLICY 175–83 (1997),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED424310.pdf [hereinafter BECOMING AN AMERICAN]; Peter J.
Levinson, A Specialized Court for Immigration Hearings and Appeals, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 644,
645–47 (1981); Maurice A. Roberts, Proposed: A Specialized Statutory Immigration Court, 18 SAN
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judges.’”5 In sum, when the DHS police arrest a person, only a prosecutor
reviews that decision. Most of these crucial decisions about a person’s liberty
occur without any review by an Article III judge.
In this Article, I propose that Congress, in recognition that immigration
detention is punishment, strip imitation judges of their authority to review
decisions about physical liberty. Such decisions should only be entrusted to
a federal magistrate judge, with review by an Article III judge. The
procedures are already in place elsewhere; Congress need look no further
than the Bail Reform Act, which applies when a person is held while awaiting
a criminal trial.6 Federal courts have borrowed heavily from criminal pretrial
detention procedures, engaging in piecemeal oversight of the immigration
detention system through habeas corpus review. I argue that these decisions
reflect lower federal courts’ persistence in monitoring the rights of
immigration detainees, even in the face of legislation that has aimed to limit
the judiciary’s role.7 Yet such review has happened for only a subset of
detainees—those who are savvy enough to file a habeas corpus petition and
lucky enough (or rich enough) to have habeas counsel, and those for whom
the federal court reaches the merits of the custody challenge before the
deportation case concludes (which moots the petition). 8 The work of these
lower federal courts has been laudable, but a better solution that reaches every
immigration detainee is necessary.
Now is the right moment to address this critical issue. The Biden
administration should focus on reforming both our broken immigration
detention and immigration adjudication systems.9 Immigration detention
reached an all-time high during the Trump administration, with a daily
population reaching over 55,000, many being warehoused by the private

DIEGO L. REV. 1, 7 (1980); SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGR. & REFUGEE POL’Y, 96TH CONG., 2D
SESS., SEMIANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS (Joint Comm. Print 1980).
5. Hon. Denise Noonan Slavin & Hon. Dorothy Harbeck, A View from the Bench by the
National Association of Immigration Judges, FED. LAW., Oct.–Nov. 2016, at 70 (“As one of our
colleagues put it, we often feel that we are ‘U.S. imitation judges.’”).
6. See infra Part III.B.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.D.
9. See Paul Wickham Schmidt, From the Heights of Kasinga to the Depths of America’s
Deadly Star Chambers: Will the Biden Administration Tap the New Due Process Army to Fix EOIR
& Save Our Nation? IMMIGRATION COURTSIDE (Nov. 12, 2020), https://immigrationcourtside.com/
2020/11/12/from-the-heights-of-kasinga-to-the-depths-of-americas-deadly-star-chambers-will-thebiden-administration-tap-the-new-due-process-army-to-fix-eoir-save-our-nation/; T. ALEXANDER
ALEINIKOFF & DONALD KERWIN, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD., THE NEW SCH. & ZOLBERG INST.
ON MIGRATION & MOBILITY, IMPROVING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM IN THE FIRST YEAR OF
THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION (Nov. 2020), https://cmsny.org/publications/immigrationrecommendations-biden/.
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prison industry.10 The Trump administration ensured a rise in immigration
arrests each year.11 The attorneys general of the Trump administration did
significant work to strip immigration judges of their independence, building
off similar work done by prior attorneys general.12 Two recent empirical
studies of immigration judge decisions demonstrate that rates of denials of
bond and relief from removal increased in the Trump administration,
providing evidence that judges are not truly independent.13 Retired
immigration judges and Board of Immigration Appeals members have
critiqued the Trump administration for repeatedly undermining the
independence of immigration judges.14 Four major national organizations—
the American Bar Association, the American Immigration Lawyers
Association, the Federal Bar Association, and the National Association of
Immigration Judges—sent a joint letter to Congress in July 2019, asking for
an independent immigration court,15 and Congress held such a hearing in
January 2020.16
This Article merges two themes from the existing scholarship: (1)
immigration judges’ lack of independence and (2) lack of procedural rights
for immigration detainees. Scholars, lawyers, judges, and congressional
committees have been recommending a more independent immigration
adjudication system for decades.17 My proposal advocates for a change to a
subset of immigration decisions, those involving physical custody. Detention
is different from other immigration decisions—scholars have argued that it
10. TRAC Immigration, ICE Detainees (2021), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
detentionstats/pop_agen_table.html ; Denise Gilman & Luis A. Romero, Immigration Detention,
Inc., 6 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 145, 148 (2018).
11. Ron Nixon, Immigration Arrests and Deportations Are Rising, I.C.E. Data Show, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/14/us/politics/illegal-immigrant-arrestsdeportations-rise.html.
12. See infra Part I.
13. Catherine Y. Kim & Amy Semet, Presidential Ideology and Immigrant Detention, 69 DUKE
L.J. 1855, 1855–56 (2020); Catherine Y. Kim & Amy Semet, An Empirical Study of Political
Control Over Immigration Adjudication, 108 GEO. L.J. 579, 585 (2020).
14. Paul Wickham Schmidt, Barr Continues Restrictionist Assault on Immigration Courts:
Intends to Reverse BIA Precedents Giving “Full Faith & Credit” to State Court Sentence
Modifications—Another Disingenuous Request For “Amicus Briefing!”, (May 30, 2019),
https://immigrationcourtside.com/2019/05/30/barr-continues-restrictionist-assault-onimmigration-courts-intends-to-reverse-bia-precedents-giving-full-faith-credit-to-state-courtsentence-modifications-another-disi/; Jeffrey S. Chase, AILA Press Call: The Immigration Courts,
OPS./ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L. (May 20, 2019), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/
5/20/aila-press-call-the-immigration-courts.
15. Joint Letter, supra note 4.
16. Courts in Crisis: The State of Judicial Independence and Due Process in U.S. Immigration
Courts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. & Citizenship, 116th Cong. (2020),
https://judiciary.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=2757.
17. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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is punishment.18 Thus, imitation judges should have no role in these
decisions. Nor does the immigration judge have any particular expertise in
determining danger and flight risk; rather, magistrate judges make these
decisions for criminal defendants on a daily basis.19 I go further than others
by proposing that the adjudicator not be an administrative law judge or even
an Article I court, but a magistrate judge, whose decisions are subject to
review by an Article III judge. I and others have advocated for stronger
procedural protections in immigration detention decisions, such as a
government-borne burden of proof, a prompt probable cause hearing, courtappointed counsel, and the requirement that judges determine alternatives to
detention and a detainee’s ability to pay; with these procedures, immigration
bond hearings can more closely track criminal pretrial detention hearings.20
My proposal here differs in that it physically moves the procedures to an
entirely different court. Rather than importing procedural protections
piecemeal into immigration court, with oversight by federal judges through
habeas corpus, I propose a system where all decisions regarding physical
custody are removed from immigration court and placed in federal district
court.
In Part I, I will describe how immigration judges are not truly
independent, but are attorneys who work under the Attorney General and may
suffer personal consequences for ruling against the enforcement priorities of
the DOJ.21 This Part will discuss examples of how immigration judges’
independence suffers, particularly in detention decisions, because their
18. See, e.g., César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1349 (2014); DANIEL WILSHER, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: LAW, HISTORY,
POLITICS xxii–xxiii (2012).
19. See infra Part III.B.
20. See, e.g., Mary Holper, Promptly Proving the Need to Detain for Post-Entry Social Control
Deportation, 52 VAL. U.L. REV. 231, 231–32 (2018); Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration
Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 2141, 2141 (2017); Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The
Deceptive Promise of Freedom from Pretrial Immigration Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157, 157 (2016);
Mary Holper, The Beast of Burden in Immigration Bond Hearings, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 75,
76 (2016); Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO.
L.J. 125, 168–69 (2015); Alina Das, Immigration Detention: Information Gaps and Institutional
Barriers to Reform, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 161–62 (2013); Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional
Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending
Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 63 (2012); Frances M. Kreimer, Dangerousness
on the Loose: Constitutional Limits to Immigration Detention as Domestic Crime Control, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1485, 1519–22 (2012); Travis Silva, Toward a Constitutionalized Theory of
Immigration Detention, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 229–30 (2012); Faiza W. Sayed,
Challenging Detention: Why Immigrant Detainees Receive Less Process Than “Enemy
Combatants” and Why They Deserve More, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1833 (2011); David Cole,
Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693,
719–22 (2009).
21. See infra Part I.
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decisions can and have been unilaterally overruled by law enforcement
actors.22 Thus, the current system’s lack of an independent judge undermines
the legitimacy of immigration detention decisions.23 In Part II, I will outline
the role that Article III courts have played in custody decisions in the modern
era of immigration detention.24 Even when Congress attempted to take away
Article III court oversight of custody decisions, the lower federal courts in
particular have monitored the right to physical liberty for immigration
detainees.25 In Part III, I will outline a proposal for reform, calling on
Congress to remove all custody decisions from the DOJ and grant jurisdiction
instead to Article III courts.26 I will conclude the article in Part IV.27
I. THE LACK OF AN INDEPENDENT IMMIGRATION JUDGE
In this section, I draw from scholarship and reports critiquing the
immigration system as lacking an independent judge, to highlight why the
involvement of Article III judges in immigration detention decisions is
needed now more than ever. I focus on examples where immigration judges’
independence has been undermined in immigration detention decisions.
A. The Historically Commingled Functions and “War on
Independence”
The various federal agencies that have enforced immigration law
throughout history have never truly separated prosecutorial and adjudicative
functions.28 The Supreme Court in 1950 held that the so-called “‘one-man’
hearing[],”29 with one person acting as both prosecutor and adjudicator in a
deportation case, did not comport with the hearing requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).30 The APA requires these functions
to be separate in order to bring trial-like procedures into administrative
hearings.31 Yet Congress then exempted deportation hearings from the
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See id.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See Holper, supra note 4, at 1307–13.
29. See Sidney B. Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes, 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES
453–59 (1988), reprinted in STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 686, 687–88 (6th ed. 2015).
30. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 45–48 (1950).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (stating that an adjudicatory officer shall not “be responsible to or subject
to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative
or prosecuting functions for an agency” and “[a]n employee or agent engaged in the performance
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APA,32 which caused the Supreme Court to later permit a “two-man” hearing
where the prosecutor and adjudicator worked together in the same agency.33
Eventually the judges broke away from the prosecutors, starting to wear
robes in 1973 and graduating to the title of immigration judge instead of
“special inquiry officer.”34 Starting in 1983, immigration prosecutors and
judges took up residence in different agencies within the DOJ.35 The
prosecutors continued to work for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (“INS”), while the immigration judges and Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) started to work for the newly-created Executive
Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), an agency of the DOJ. 36 An
empirical study of bond hearings conducted in the Chicago immigration court
demonstrated an institutional culture of judges during this time period that
valued their desire for enhanced stature and independence, “probably [to]
encourage their independence from the INS.”37
The immigration adjudication system established in 1983 persists to this
day, with immigration judges in courts throughout the country making triallevel decisions.38 Either the prosecutor or noncitizen can appeal an
immigration judge’s decision to the Board, a single appellate body that sits
in Virginia.39 The manner in which Board members make their decisions
drastically changed in 2002. While Board members typically decided cases
by three-member panels issuing written decisions, Attorney General Ashcroft
of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually
related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency
review . . . except as witness or counsel in public proceedings.”). The APA language regarding
separation of functions is largely the same as when the APA first was enacted in 1946. See Wong
Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 35 n.1 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 5 (1946)).
32. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306–307 (1955).
33. Rawitz, supra note 29, at 687–88; see also Marcello, 349 U.S. at 306–10.
34. See Jeffrey S. Chase, Lecture at Cornell L. Sch., Berger Int’l Speaker Series: The
Immigration Court: Issues and Solutions (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/
blog/2019/3/28/i6el1do6l5p443u1nkf8vwr28dv9qi; Rawitz, supra note 29, at 688–89. A
Department of Justice policy in 1994 required robes to be worn during hearings. Jain, supra note
4, at 290.
35. Board of Immigration Appeals; Immigration Review Function; Editorial Amendments, 48
Fed. Reg. 8,056 (Feb. 25, 1983) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 0).
36. Id.
37. Janet A. Gilboy, Administrative Review in a System of Conflicting Values, 13 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 515, 524 (1988); see also Janet A. Gilboy, Setting Bail in Deportation Cases: The Role of
Immigration Judges, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347 (1987) (providing more detailed findings from an
empirical study of Chicago immigration courts’ bond redetermination practices).
38. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1641–42. Today,
there are seventy-one separate immigration courts throughout the United States. EOIR Immigration
Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-immigration-court-listing (last
updated May 11, 2021).
39. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1643.
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announced procedural shortcuts in 2002 that allowed a single Board member
to affirm an immigration judge’s decision without a written opinion. 40 The
immigration adjudication system also permits the Attorney General to act as
an adjudicator, and thus decide certain precedent-setting cases that
immigration judges and the Board are bound to follow.41
Twenty years after the creation of EOIR, immigration prosecutors were
moved to the newly-created DHS and no longer worked within the same
agency as the adjudicators.42 Yet, a key component of the original blended
functions remained—judges and the Board, the supposedly independent
adjudicators, were supervised by the country’s top law enforcement officer,
as they all worked for the DOJ.43 At this same time, the DOJ began what
Stephen Legomsky has called a “war on independence” of the immigration
adjudicators.44 Legomsky outlines three types of constraints that executive
or legislative actors can impose on the authority of the adjudicator: (1) the
substitution of a general rule for individualized adjudication or judgment; (2)
a decision by an executive or administrative official to intervene in a pending
case; and (3) a threat of personal consequences to adjudicators (including
reassignment to a less desirable position, nonrenewal of appointment, or loss
of compensation) if they do not reach a certain type of outcome.45
In 2002, not long after the National Association of Immigration Judges
(“NAIJ”) issued a proposal for an independent court, Attorney General
Ashcroft published a final rule that reduced the size of the Board from
twenty-three to eleven members.46 This caused Board members who ruled
most frequently in favor of immigrants to be reassigned to non-adjudicative
positions within the Department.47 The DOJ reminded critics of the move
40. Id. at 1657–58; see also Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note
4, at 375. This change in the procedures used by the Board were accompanied by the other changes
that impacted the Board, which this Article describes infra in notes 39–44 and accompanying text.
41. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h). This Article further discusses the Attorney General’s use of this
authority to decide immigration precedential decisions in the detention context infra notes 84–143.
42. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
43. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 4, at 3–4; see also Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus,
Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 1024 (1998) (“The
Attorney General . . . and other political appointees in the Justice Department are politically
accountable for their success in creating the reality or appearance of border control, in general or in
well-publicized cases.”).
44. See Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 4, at 370 (“I submit
it is accurate to depict the sum of these various measures as an all-out war on the very notion of
decisional independence in the adjudication of immigration cases.”).
45. Id. at 369–71. In his article, Legomsky focuses on the third type of decisional
independence. Id. at 387–89.
46. Id. at 373–76.
47. Id. at 376 (citing Levinson, The Façade of Quasi-Judicial Independence, supra note 4, at
1164).
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that “[e]ach Board member is a Department of Justice attorney who is
appointed by, and may be removed or reassigned by, the Attorney General.”48
These reassignments marked the first time in the Board’s history that an
Attorney General had removed a Board member.49 The 2002 final DOJ rule
also identified a different degree of independence by the Board.50 Legomsky
noted that although the reassignments impacted only Board members, “the
reference to ‘[a]ll attorneys’ makes clear that the attorney general intended
the quoted language to apply to immigration judges as well.”51 In the Trump
administration, former Attorney General Sessions reminded immigration
judges of their subservient role in carrying out the Trump administration’s
priorities of having “zero illegal immigration in this country.”52 Sessions
went so far as to remove one immigration judge from adjudicating several
cases because of that judge’s lenience toward noncitizens.53
In 2002, the DOJ also formally implemented “case completion goals”
for the immigration adjudicators.54 Case completion goals often dictate a
result that favors the government, and thus gives one party appearing before
a supposedly “neutral” judge an unfair advantage.55 The DOJ did not
publicly state that actions would be taken against individual judges for failure

48. Board of Immigration Appeals; Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed.
Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3 (2002)).
49. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 4, at 379.
50. Id. Until 2002, a regulation stated that “Board members shall exercise their independent
judgment and discretion in the cases coming before the Board.” Id. (quoting former 8 C.F.R. §
3.1(a)(1) (2002)). The new rule rearranged the priorities, stating that “Board members shall be
attorneys appointed by the Attorney General to act as the Attorney General’s delegates in the cases
that come before them.” Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(a)(1), 3.1(d)(1)(ii) (2003)). Only later does a
“diluted version” of the decisional independence language appear. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii)
(2005) (“Subject to the governing standards . . . , Board members shall exercise their independent
judgment and discretion in considering and determining the cases coming before the Board . . . .”).
51. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1670 (alteration in
original) (quoting Board of Immigration Appeals; Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,893 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003)).
52. Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 22 (2018)
(quoting Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review
Legal Training Program in Washington, D.C. (June 11, 2018)). In remarks during the EOIR’s Legal
Training Program, Attorney General Sessions asserted, “‘all of us should agree that, by definition,
we ought to have zero illegal immigration in this country,’ and reminded immigration judges in
attendance that they [must] “conduct designated proceedings ‘subject to such supervision and shall
perform such duties as the Attorney General shall prescribe.’” Id. (alteration in original).
53. Tal Kopan, Immigration Judge Removed from Cases After Perceived Criticism of Sessions,
CNN (Aug. 8, 2018, 5:49 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/08/politics/immigration-judgesjustice-department-grievance/index.html.
54. Noonan Slavin & Marks, supra note 4, at 1787.
55. See Holper, supra note 4, at 1317–19; Chase, supra note 34 (“[J]ust to be clear, the quotas
are not designed to have a neutral impact; the administration hopes that forcing more completions
will also result in more denials.”).
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to comply, yet a 2008 study concerning immigration judge burnout revealed
a common perception of the mandatory nature of the case completion goals.56
In the Trump administration, immigration judges’ fears became a reality,
when Attorney General Sessions in 2018 proposed individual production
quotas on immigration judges, instead of the former case completion goals
that were imposed on each immigration court.57 A judge’s failure to complete
a certain number of cases would impact the judge’s performance evaluation.58
According to the President of the NAIJ, this “unprecedented
move . . . violates every tenet of an independent court and judges,”59 as “the
NAIJ is not aware of a single state or federal court across the country that
imposes the type of production quotas and deadlines on judges like those that
EOIR has now announced.”60
In 2006, Attorney General Gonzales announced a system of
performance evaluations for each immigration judge and Board member.61
In 2007, regulations went into effect that made explicit the legal authority to
establish such a performance evaluation system—without any input or public
disclosure of the procedures, and without criteria for determining what

56. See Noonan Slavin & Marks, supra note 4, at 1787–88; see also Stuart L. Lustig et al.,
Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the National Association of Immigration
Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57, 64–66 (2008) (quoting an immigration
judge who stated “[w]hat is required . . . is quantity over quality”).
57. EOIR Performance Plan: Adjudicative Employees, CNN, http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/
2018/images/04/02/immigration-judges-memo.pdf; Tal Kopan, Justice Department rolls out case
quotas for immigration judges, CNN (Apr. 2, 2018, 8:55 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2018/04/02/politics/immigration-judges-quota/index.html; Tabaddor, supra note 4, at 7 (comparing
former court-specific case completion goals with new quotas for individual judges).
58. Tabaddor, supra note 4, at 7. At the same time, Attorney General Sessions took other
measures to ensure that fewer noncitizens could ultimately be granted relief by an immigration
judge. For one, he eliminated administrative closure, a measure that takes a noncitizen’s case off
the docket of the immigration court while an application for relief is pending in another agency. See
Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 281 (A.G. 2018). He also instructed judges to be more
stringent in their continuances, requiring them to factor in both “administrative efficiency” (case
completion goals) and DHS objections when deciding whether to grant continuances. See Matter
of L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405, 415–17 (A.G. 2018). These two cases combined to ensure that
those with applications for relief pending before another agency were more likely to be ordered
deported before that application is decided.
59. Tabaddor, supra note 4, at 7.
60. Id. at 8; see also Betsy Swan, New Quotas for Immigration Judges are ‘Incredibly
Concerning,’ Critics Warn, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 2, 2018, 6:58 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com
/new-quotas-for-immigration-judges-are-a-recipe-for-disaster-critics-warn?ref=scroll.
61. See Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà Vu
of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 496 (2007) (citing Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines Reforms for
Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html).
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constitutes good “performance.”62 The newest rendition of the performance
evaluation criteria includes both individual quotas for case completion and a
limit on the number of reversals by the Board.63 Because the Board members
left in place after the 2002 purge proved more likely to reverse an immigrantfriendly decision, under the new performance metrics, an immigration judge
who rules too often in favor of a noncitizen runs the risk of exceeding the
limit on the number of Board reversals.64 Legomsky writes that the combined
effect of the reassignments of Board members, adjusted “independence”
regulations, and performance evaluations “remind surviving and future BIA
members and immigration judges that they hold their jobs at the discretion of
one of the opposing parties in the cases that come before them.”65
In 2008, concern over the political hiring of immigration judges caused
a congressional committee to examine these claims. The DOJ’s former
liaison to the White House, Monica Goodling, testified before the U.S. House
Judiciary Committee that, from 2004 to 2006, the DOJ and White House
appointed immigration judges based on their Republican Party affiliations or
conservative political views, bypassing the usual procedures.66 Although
these concerns righted themselves in response to this congressional inquiry,67
the concerns reemerged when the Trump administration hired additional

62. Id. at 496 (citing Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,673, 53,675 (Sept. 20,
2007) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1240 (2007)); Tabaddor, supra note 4, at 5 (critiquing
immigration judges’ performance reviews by comparing them to other judges’ reviews, where “the
overwhelming majority of these reviews follow a judicial model—a transparent, public process
where performance is evaluated by input from the stakeholders (attorneys, witnesses, and court
staff) based on quality and temperament, not quantity, and is not tied to discipline.”).
63. EOIR Performance Plan, supra note 57.
64. See Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 4, at 376; Levinson,
The Façade of Quasi-Judicial Independence, supra note 4, at 1164.
65. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1671.
66. Id. at 1665–66 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF PRO.’ RESP. & OFF. OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN.,’ AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA
GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 69–124 (2008),
https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/special/s0807/final.pdf.
The usual procedures
involved an announcement of the vacancy, minimum requirements, and a statement that the DOJ
does not discriminate on bases such as political affiliation. Id. at 72. The announcement also stated
that applicants must fulfill three or more of five criteria: (1) knowledge of immigration laws and
procedures; (2) substantial litigation experience, preferably in a high-volume context; (3) experience
handling complex legal issues; (4) experience conducting administrative hearings; and (5)
knowledge of judicial practices and procedures. Id. EOIR Officials would then conduct an
interview process conducted by the Chief Immigration Judge and Assistant Chief Immigration
Judges, with a recommendation to the EOIR Director for the desired candidates. Id.
67. See Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1666 (discussing
Attorney General’s 2007 “new immigration judge appointment process in which EOIR would once
again play the dominant role”).
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immigration judges to clear up the current case backlog.68 In this process,
there were allegations that candidates were rejected “based on their perceived
political or ideological views.”69 Jeffrey Chase, a former immigration judgeturned immigration court-watcher, blogged in March 2019 that “[a]t present,
nearly all new IJ hires are former prosecutors or those who otherwise have
been deemed to fit this administration’s ideological profile.”70 Chase’s views
reflect an empirical reality that spans beyond the Trump administration; the
past three administrations have disproportionately hired immigration judges
with backgrounds as immigration prosecutors, instead of those who worked
as defense counsel.71
The Biden administration has followed the same well-worn path of
hiring former immigration prosecutors as judges. The first seventeen
immigration judges the Biden administration hired were selected during the
Trump administration and their immigration experience, if any, involved
working for ICE.72 The hiring priorities for immigration judges stands in
stark contrast to the administration’s selection process for Article III judges,
which has prioritized hiring candidates from diverse professional
backgrounds,73 including former public defenders.74
What we see developing over the past two decades in the “war on
independence” is a shift in the institutional culture of the agency housing
immigration adjudicators.75 While immigration judges worked hard in the
1970s and 80s to distance themselves from INS prosecutors,76 the DOJ reined
the judges in, reminding them in various ways that they served at the pleasure

68. See Tom Dart, Jeff Sessions Accused of Political Bias in Hiring Immigration Judges,
GUARDIAN (June 16, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jun/16/jeff-sessionspolitical-bias-hiring-immigration-judges.
69. Id.; see also Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1689
(“The tawdry hiring practices that so badly tarnished EOIR and other components of the Department
of Justice have since been corrected, but without congressional action, nothing prevents future
Justice Department and White House officials from lapsing.”) (citations omitted).
70. Chase, supra note 34.
71. Kim & Semet, Political Control Over Immigration Adjudication, supra note 13, at 612–16;
Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1666.
72. Rebecca Beitsch, Biden Fills Immigration Court with Trump Hires, HILL (May 8, 2021),
https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/552373-biden-fills-immigration-court-with-trumphires.
73. Madeleine Carlisle, Inside Joe Biden’s Plan to Confirm Diverse Federal Judges, TIME
(May 11, 2021), https://time.com/6047501/joe-biden-federal-judges/.
74. On the Bench: Federal Judiciary; ACS’s Judicial News Roundup, AM. CONST. SOC’Y,
(May 13, 2021), https://www.acslaw.org/judicial-nominations/on-the-bench/ (“[T]he White House
put an emphasis on the professional and personal diversity of these nominees. The White House
particularly highlighted that several of the nominees had spent time as federal defenders.”).
75. See Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 4, at 369–70.
76. See Gilboy, Administrative Review, supra note 37, at 524.
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of the Attorney General and that their jobs were threatened if their results
were too immigrant-friendly.77 The DOJ has twice sought to decertify the
immigration judges’ union, an effort to destroy a major voice advocating for
the creation of an independent immigration court, which saw success on the
eve of the November 2020 election.78
B. Undermining Immigration Judges’ Independence by Substituting a
General Detention Rule for Individual Adjudication
While the previous section describes how judges were made to believe
they would suffer professional consequences for ruling against the
government, this Section outlines examples of DOJ actors substituting a
general rule for individual adjudication by judges, which presents another
manner in which immigration judges’ independence is undermined.79 Each
of these examples impacted immigration judges’ detention decisions.
Immigration judges’ assertion of greater judicial independence in the
late 1970s and early 1980s led to a high rate of judges lowering bonds set
initially by the INS.80 INS officials viewed “immigration judges as pushy
intruders whose demands in the name of due process only obstruct the [INS]

77. See Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 4, at 372; Jain, supra
note 4, at 306.
78. See Richard Gonzales, Trump Administration Seeks Decertification of Immigration Judges’
Union, NPR (Aug. 12, 2019, 9:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/12/750656176/trumpadministration-seeks-decertification-of-immigration-judges-union. On July 31, 2020, the Federal
Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA”) rejected this attempt, refusing to revisit its 2000 decision that
immigration judges were not “management officials” and therefore could unionize. Decision and
Order, Dep’t of Justice, EOIR and NAIJ, WA-RP-19-0067 (F.L.R.A. July 31, 2020). The FLRA
abruptly reversed course on November 2, 2020, in what the NAIJ has referred to as a “politicallymotivated decision.” Decision and Order, Dep’t of Justice, EOIR and NAIJ, WA-RP-19-0067
(F.L.R.A. November 2, 2020); Letter from NAIJ to Att’y Gen. Merrick Garland (June 7, 2021),
https://www.naij-usa.org/images/uploads/newsroom/Final%2B06072021%2BSign%2Bon%2
BLetter%2B-%2BNAIJ%2BDOJ%2BWithdraw%2BFLRA%2BPetition.pdf. The NAIJ has sought
reconsideration of the decision. See Joe Davidson, For Judges, Biden’s Actions Are a Split
Decision, WASH. POST (July 4, 2021, 4:17 PM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/for-judges-bidens-actions-are-a-split-decision/2021/07/04/3233f122-dce9-11eb-a5010e69b5d012e5_story.html.
79. See Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 4, at 387–88.
80. See Gilboy, Setting Bail, supra note 37, at 368–69 (reporting results of an empirical study
of immigration judge bonds set during a period in 1983 by Chicago immigration judges—the busiest
immigration court in the country at the time—where 95% who asked an immigration judge to review
the INS bond got a lower bond, and no immigration judge increased the bond amount). In a white
paper to the INS regarding its detention strategies in 1997, Peter Schuck noted disparities between
INS and immigration judge bonds, and recommended that the Deputy Attorney “adopt guidelines
and policies designed to better coordinate bonding decisions and to impose departmental priorities
and policies on EOIR as well as the INS.” Peter H. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A “White
Paper,” 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 683–84 (1997).
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mission.”81 INS’s General Counsel publicly stated that the agency’s
regulatory agenda was to set higher minimum bonds for judges to impose.
Alternatively, INS aimed to entirely eliminate immigration judge review of
their bonds, which would leave INS’ bond decision as final and unreviewable
by any other agency actor.82 Under the General Counsel’s view, immigration
judge review of INS bond decisions was an “‘outrageous waste of their time,’
time presumably better spent on conducting deportation hearings to reduce
court delays and absconding.”83
The DOJ responded to INS’s concerns over immigration judges
reducing INS bonds, first through the automatic stay regulation. 84 Adopted
initially in 1998, the “automatic stay” created an INS override to an
immigration judge’s decision to release a noncitizen.85 This regulation
effectively allows an INS prosecutor, after losing at a bond hearing, to
overrule the immigration judge’s decision during the appeal period.86
Initially, the automatic stay only applied to noncitizens who were deportable
for certain criminal convictions, and thus subject to laws that required either
presumptive or mandatory detention.87 In the wake of the September 11,
81. Roberts, supra note 4, at 8–9. It is important to note that immigration prosecutors have
multiple reasons to oppose release. First, they perform a law enforcement role of protecting the
public against those they perceive to be dangerous. Second, they seek to ensure that persons do not
frustrate efforts at future deportation, should that be ordered. See Demore v Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
517–21 (2003) (discussing government’s stated goals of immigration detention). Finally, there is
an unspoken goal of detention: immigration prosecutors are more likely to obtain a removal order
because detainees often give up meritorious claims, are less adequately prepared with evidence to
support their claims, and are less likely to obtain representation. See Jayashri Srikantiah,
Reconsidering Money Bail in Immigration Detention, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 521, 542 (2018).
82. Gilboy, Setting Bail, supra note 37, at 394–95 (citing Maurice C. Inman, Jr., Gen. Couns.,
IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., Speech at the American Immigration Lawyers Association
Annual Conference (June 4–9, 1985) (on file with Convention Seminar Cassettes)).
83. Id. at 350 (quoting Maurice C. Inman, Jr., Gen. Couns., IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION
SERV., Speech at the American Immigration Lawyers Association Annual Conference (June 4–9,
1985) (on file with Convention Seminar Cassettes)).
84. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.6(c)(1)–(5), 1003.19(i)(2) (2020). For critiques of this regulation, see
Raha Jorjani, Ignoring the Court’s Order: The Automatic Stay in Immigration Detention Cases, 5
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 89, 90 (2010); David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process
Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1030–31 (2002); Marks, An Urgent
Priority, supra note 4, at 12; David A. Martin, Preventive Detention: Immigration Law Lessons for
the Enemy Combatant Debate, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 305, 312–13 (2004) (arguing that the press
distorted the meaning of the DOJ’s actions in its expansion of the automatic stay regulation post
9/11, but that the regulation still needs to be revisited).
85. Procedures for the Detention and Release of Criminal Aliens by the INS and for Custody
Redeterminations by the EOIR, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,441, 27,443, 27,447 (May 19, 1998) (codified at 8
C.F.R. pts. 3, 236).
86. Jorjani, supra note 84, at 101.
87. Procedures for the Detention and Release of Criminal Aliens by the INS and for Custody
Redeterminations by the EOIR, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,441, 27,443, 27,447 (May 19, 1998) (codified at 8
C.F.R. pts. 3, 236); see also Holper, Beast of Burden, supra note 20, at 83–88 (describing the
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2001 terrorist attacks Attorney General Ashcroft expanded the authority in
an interim regulation, which he promulgated quickly without awaiting the
comment period.88 Under the 2001 interim regulation, the INS trial attorney
could invoke this authority in any case where the INS set either no bond or a
minimum bond of $10,000 in its original custody determination.89 No longer
was the authority limited to those who were deemed presumptively
unbailable by Congress.90 Thus, the INS could essentially determine the
outcome of a bond hearing before an immigration judge by setting an initial
bond of at least $10,000 or no bond, thereby allowing its prosecutors to later
invoke the automatic stay and hold someone in detention regardless of the
immigration judge’s ruling.91
The final rule was issued in 2006 after a notice-and-comment period in
which modest changes were made to the final rule, none of which addressed
concerns over immigration judge independence.92 Responding to comments
that the automatic stay undermined immigration judge independence, EOIR
characterized immigration judges and immigration prosecutors (who at that
point were housed within the DHS) as all acting together, carrying out the

evolution of the statute governing detention of those convicted of certain crimes and terrorism,
which at first rendered detainees “presumptively unbailable” and now requires mandatory detention
without a bond hearing).
88. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Review of Custody Determinations, 66 Fed.
Reg. 54,909, 54,910 (Oct. 31, 2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3).
89. Id. at 54,910.
90. See Procedures for the Detention and Release of Criminal Aliens by the INS and for
Custody Redeterminations by the EOIR, 63 Fed. Reg. at 27,447.
91. Some habeas courts addressed the adjudicator independence problem that the 2001 version
of the regulation created. See, e.g., Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp. 2d 662, 671 (D.N.J. 2003)
(reasoning that the automatic stay “produces a patently unfair situation by ‘tak[ing] the stay decision
out of the hands of the judges altogether and giv[ing] it to the prosecutor who has by definition
failed to persuade a judge in an adversary hearing that detention is justified.’”) (quoting Cole, supra
note 84, at 1031) (alteration in original); Zabadi v. Chertoff, No. C 05-01796 WHA, 2005 WL
1514122, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2005) (holding that the regulation was ultra vires as it
“eliminate[d] the discretionary authority of immigration judges to determine whether an individual
may be released, thereby exceeding the authority bestowed” by Congress and reasoning that it
“impermissibly merge[d] the functions of adjudicator and prosecutor.”); Almonte-Vargas v.
Elwood, No. CIV.A. 02-CV-2666, 2002 WL 1471555, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002) (describing
the automatic stay as “accomplishing Petitioner’s mandatory detention” by allowing the trial
attorney to override the judge’s release order).
92. Review of Custody Determinations, 71 Fed. Reg. 57,873 (Oct. 2, 2006) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
pt. 1003). The final rule set a time limit on the duration of the automatic stay, providing that it
would expire in ninety days if the Board did not decide the appeal of the bond decision. Id. at
57,874. The final rule also requires that a supervisory DHS officer sign off on the automatic stay
filing, and that the DHS certify that there is factual and legal support for its position. Id.
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Attorney General’s broad authority to detain and release a noncitizen on bond
pending a decision to deport.93
A second example of the undermining of immigration judges’
independence in detention decisions involves a pair of detention-related
decisions made by two different Attorneys General pursuant to the referral
authority.94 The referral authority regulation allows the Attorney General to
take a decision away from the Board and become the final adjudicator on a
legal issue. The first detention case of importance is Attorney General
Ashcroft’s 2003 decision in In re D-J-.95 In that case, Attorney General
Ashcroft instructed judges and the Board to consider national security
interests—including deterring mass migrations from one country—in
addition to dangerousness and flight risk when making bond
determinations.96 Earlier in the proceedings, the Judge and Board had
rejected such arguments by the government and released a Haitian detainee
on bond.97 Having lost these arguments, the Attorney General converted
himself from the nation’s top law enforcement officer into the nation’s top
immigration adjudicator, utilizing the referral authority to change the rules of
bond determinations to accommodate his enforcement priorities.
Over a decade later, under the Obama administration, the DHS reprised
the deterrence rationale, citing In re D-J-, to detain Central American
migrants after a “surge” of border crossings in 2014.98 In a class action
lawsuit more than a decade after In re D-J-, a federal district court held that
general deterrence of future border crossers was not a permissible reason to
justify civil detention.99 For the many Haitian detainees who lost their bond
hearings in the immediate aftermath of In re D-J-, but before the class action
suit, no federal court stepped in to tell immigration adjudicators that it was
unconstitutional to consider deterrence into a bond decision. Only twelve

93. Id. at 57,877 (“Under longstanding provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the
Attorney General has had broad detention authority. Now, after enactment of the HSA, the Secretary
of Homeland Security exercises that discretion in carrying out the detention and enforcement
authority formerly administered by the INS, and the Attorney General and his delegates (the Board
and the immigration judges) exercise that discretion in the review of the custody decisions initially
made by DHS.”) (citations omitted). Once the final regulation went into effect, setting a time limit
of ninety days on the duration of detention under the automatic stay, many habeas courts were not
able to reach a decision on the legal challenge because the issue became moot. See, e.g., Hussain
v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 739, 742–43 (7th Cir. 2007); Altayar v. Lynch, No. CV-16-02479-PHX-GMS
(JZB), 2016 WL 7383340, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 23, 2016).
94. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2020).
95. 23 I. & N. Dec. 572 (A.G. 2003).
96. Id. at 581.
97. Id. at 573–74.
98. R.I.L.-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 175 (D.D.C. 2015).
99. Id. at 188–89.
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years later was the government told by an Article III court that bond decisions
justified by the deterrence rationale were illegal.100
A more recent detention case is Attorney General Barr’s 2019 decision
in In re M-S-,101 which entirely removed immigration judges’ discretion over
bond for some asylum-seekers.102 This decision specifically overruled a 2005
Board decision that asylum-seekers who recently crossed the border were
eligible for bond.103 The M-S- decision was enjoined pending a challenge in
federal court,104 yet the Supreme Court in 2021 vacated that order and
remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit.105 It is uncertain whether the M-Sdecision will suffer the same demise as the deterrence rationale for detention
that Attorney General Ashcroft established in D-J-.106 Regardless of the fate
of this decision, it stands as another example of an affront to immigration
judges’ independence that Article III courts must consistently police. 107
Significantly troubling is that the decision came on the heels of empirical
findings that, for recently-arrived families seeking asylum, immigration
judges were routinely lowering bonds initially set by the DHS, putting
freedom within reach while the families fought their cases.108 The M-Sdecision represents Attorney General Barr going even further to take away
immigration judges’ independence than Attorney General Ashcroft, in

100. See id.
101. 27 I. & N. Dec. 509 (A.G. 2019).
102. Id. at 509–10, 518–19.
103. See id. at 519 (overruling Matter of X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731, 735–36 (BIA 2005)).
104. See Padilla v. ICE, No. 19-35565, __ F.3d __, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 9603, *12–13, 15–
27 (9th Cir. March 27, 2020).
105. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t v. Padilla, 141 S. Ct. 1041 (2021). The Court ordered the Ninth
Circuit to reconsider its decision in light of its 2020 holding in Dep’t Homeland Sec. v.
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020). Padilla, 141 S. Ct. at 1041–42. In Thursaissigiam, the
Court considered a Due Process challenge to immigration procedures brought by a noncitizen who
physically entered the United States but was arrested by immigration authorities close to the border.
140 S.Ct. at 1981–82. The Court held that the Due Process clause did not apply because the
noncitizen’s status was assimilated to that of an “alien seeking initial entry,” who do not enjoy any
Due Process protections. Id.
106. See R.I.L.-R, 80 F. Supp. 3d at 188–89; see also HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IS
MANDATORY DETENTION OF UNLAWFUL ENTRANTS SEEKING ASYLUM CONSTITUTIONAL? 4
(2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10343.
107. See Letter from Robert M. Carlson, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to William P. Barr, U.S.
Att’y Gen. (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
government_affairs_office/aba-letter-to-ag-barrre-matter-of-m-s-4-23-19.pdf (“We are also
concerned that this decision [in Matter of M-S-] is one more step in a series of recent actions by the
Department of Justice to remove discretion and restrict the authority of immigration judges.”).
108. See INGRID EAGLY, STEVEN SHAFER, & JANA WHALLEY, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL,
DETAINING FAMILIES: A STUDY OF ASYLUM ADJUDICATION IN FAMILY DETENTION 3 (Aug. 2018),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/detaining_families_a_stu
dy_of_asylum_adjudication_in_family_detention_final.pdf.
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response to a President who demanded more detention to deter future bordercrossers and appease his political base.109
While many have critiqued the Attorney General’s referral authority,110
former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and DOJ Office of Immigration
Litigation (“OIL”) attorney Patrick Glen defended the authority in a 2016 law
review article.111 Gonzales and Glen tell the story of a Board that is not an
independent adjudicatory body at all, but rather a set of attorneys who serve
to advise the Attorney General.112 This view presents a clear contradiction
to the way the NAIJ, various committees of Congress, lawyers, and scholars
have viewed the role of immigration adjudicators—as independent actors
who should be free from political influence.113 Rather, Gonzales and Glen
unabashedly describe the Board as part of the DOJ’s policymaking
109. See Schmidt, supra note 14; Philip Rucker & David Weigel, Trump Advocates Depriving
Undocumented Immigrants of Due-Process Rights, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018, 8:38 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/trump-advocates-depriving-undocumentedimmigrants-of-due-process-rights/2018/06/24/dfa45d36-77bd-11e8-93cc6d3beccdd7a3_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.05c119748f4a.
110. See, e.g., Bijal Shah, The Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, 102 IOWA L.
REV. ONLINE. 129, 153 (2017) (arguing that the attorney general review authority has “interrupted
the development of immigration law by the judiciary, altered legislative standards, and restructured
the agency’s own application of immigration policy, often with partisan interests in mind.”);
Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1671–72 (“In the present
context, agency head review is particularly troublesome because the agency head is the attorney
general, who serves as the nation’s chief law enforcement official. Allowing a law enforcement
official to reverse the decision of an adjudicatory tribunal is problematic—particularly in
proceedings in which the government is one of the opposing parties.”); Jill E. Family, Beyond
Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U.
KAN. L. REV. 541, 544 (2011); Justin Chasco, Judge Alberto Gonzales? The Attorney General’s
Power to Overturn Board of Immigration Appeals’ Decisions, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 363, 381 (2007);
Margaret H. Taylor, Behind the Scenes of St. Cyr and Zadvydas: Making Policy in the Midst of
Litigation, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 271, 288 (2002) (“To critics, Attorney General review of BIA
decisions violates the independence of the Board, and (especially when review is at the behest of
the INS) breaches the separation of function between the immigration enforcers at INS and the
adjudicators at the Executive Office for Immigration Review.”); BECOMING AN AMERICAN, supra
note 4, at 244–45, 248; Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and
the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 458–62 (2007); Marks, An Urgent Priority, supra
note 4, at 17–18; Levinson, A Specialized Court, supra note 4, at 650.
111. Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy
Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 848–50 (2016).
112. See id. at 848–57. In response to critiques about how this authority encroaches on the
Board’s independence, Gonzales and Glen state, “The Attorney General is not usurping the
authority of the Board when he reviews its decisions, but is exercising an authority that has been
given to him by Congress.” Id. at 899. They cite to one AG’s justification of this authority, “[T]he
Board acts on the Attorney General’s behalf rather than as an independent body. The relationship
between the Board and the Attorney General thus is analogous to an employee and his superior
rather than to the relationship between an administrative agency and a reviewing court.” Id. at 899–
900 (quoting Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 289 n.9 (A.G. 1991) (alteration in
original)).
113. See supra note 4.
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process.114 They write that “the referral authority [to the Attorney General]
can be a robust tool for the advancement of executive branch immigration
policy,”115 and describe several examples of Attorneys General “setting
policy” through the review authority so that future cases decided by
immigration judges and the Board would be bound by that policy.116
Although it is true that agency head review is common across administrative
law,117 the Department of Justice, which litigates on behalf of agencies,
usually does not have authority over the administrative adjudications of other
executive branch agencies.118
What is particularly troubling about this review authority is that the OIL
and the U.S. Attorneys’ Office, which both prosecute immigration cases
when they reach the federal courts, are also housed within the DOJ.119 It
would presumably be quite easy for these prosecutors—who advocate for
interpretations of immigration statutes that result in deportation, detention, or
denial of immigration status—to persuade their boss to issue a decision that
favors their position before a federal court.120 Considering that the Attorney
114. Gonzales and Glen Gonzales describe the referral authority as “adjudication”
notwithstanding its proposed use in policymaking, which is a separate function. See Gonzales &
Glen, supra note 111, at 896.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 874–85. Indeed, they argue that attorney general review is disfavored when the
issue is discretionary, fact-determinative, or “not susceptible to bright-line rulemaking.” Id. at 860.
117. See Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice, supra note 110, at 458; Peter L.
Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections
on the Interior Department’s Administration of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1270
(1974).
118. See Taylor, supra note 110, at 294; see also Shah, supra note 110, at 136 (noting that the
“exercise of the referral and review power [by the AG] runs counter to administrative decisionmaking norms and may even be unconstitutional.”) (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 159
(1945)); Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 4, at 1672 (“Allowing a
law enforcement official to reverse the decision of an adjudicatory tribunal is problematic—
particularly in proceedings in which the government is one of the opposing parties.”).
119. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.45(k) (2020). When a noncitizen files a petition for review of an order
of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, the Office of Immigration Litigation Appellate Section
normally defends the government’s position before the circuit court of appeals. See Appellate
Section, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, CIV. DIV., OFF. OF IMMIGR. LITIG., (last updated Jan. 12, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/civil/appellate-section. When an immigration case reaches the federal
district court through a habeas petition (where an immigration detainee challenges unlawful
detention), mandamus action (where a noncitizen asks the court to force the agency to adjudicate a
case), or APA petition (where a federal court reviews the denial of an immigration petition by the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services), the U.S. Attorney’s Office normally defends the
government’s position, unless the U.S. Attorney’s Office decides to call upon OIL’s District Court
Section. See District Court Section, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, CIV. DIV., OFF. OF IMMIGR. LITIG., (last
updated Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/civil/district-court-section.
120. See Memorandum of Law of Amici Curiae Am. Immigr. Laws. Ass’n et al., in Support of
Reconsideration of Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec 687 (AG 2008) 10,
https://www.aila.org/infonet/amicus-brief-cristoval-silva-trevino (“Because the Office of
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General frequently writes published opinions defining ambiguous
immigration law terms, and thus arguably commanding of Chevron deference
with that decision so long as it reasonable,121 the prosecutors can almost
guarantee a win in court by pushing their boss to interpret a statute in a way
that favors their litigation position. 122 As a result, noncitizens and their
advocates lose faith in the immigration adjudication system, which ostensibly
exists to provide a neutral forum, yet permits the prosecutor’s opinion to
become law.123
C. The Increasingly Frail Independence of Immigration Judges
The DOJ’s control over immigration adjudication has steadily
increased. The Trump administration’s Attorneys General made broad-brush
asylum decisions, seeking to cut off asylum eligibility to various groups. 124
Proposed asylum rules by the EOIR and the DHS sought to severely limit
Immigration Litigation . . . [is] part of the Department of Justice, and [is] charged with defending
the agency in court, the Attorney General bears a special responsibility to maintain both the
appearance and actuality of impartiality in the adjudication of removal charges and to protect the
certification process from efforts to make it a backdoor mechanism for one-sided ex parte
communication by the office’s litigators.”); see also Taylor, supra note 110, at 288–89 (describing
use of attorney general review authority in immigration law to advance the government’s litigation
position in the Supreme Court case INS v. St. Cyr). Gonzales and Glen describe this type of nonobjective interference as a “caricature.” Gonzales & Glen, supra note 111, at 919. Margaret Taylor
has disputed such a characterization. See Margaret H. Taylor, Midnight Agency Adjudication:
Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE
18, 35–36 n.121 (2016).
121. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 111, at 857; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984) (holding deference is accorded to an agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous statute so long as the interpretation is reasonable); Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–82 (2005) (permitting deference
to an agency’s change of position within the Chevron framework so long as the agency adequately
explains that change). But see Shah, supra note 110, at 141 (“[B]ecause the Attorney General is
removed from the agency’s expertise in immigration, scholars might also debate the proper level of
judicial deference to administrative decision-making in immigration or perhaps any are of law in
which a political official exercise [sic] discretion beyond her core competencies.”).
122. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 111, at 919 (acknowledging that “Attorney General
review could have beneficial effects on litigation, in the form of a final agency decision that would
be entitled to Chevron deference before the courts,” but asserting that “the machinery of referral
and review is not aimed at such ends.”). But see Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688–
89 (A.G. 2008) (invoking Brand X to justify the AG’s decision to modify interpretation of moral
turpitude statute); Taylor, supra note 110, at 288 (“The Attorney General interceded to vacate a rare
en banc opinion of the BIA at a critical juncture—on precisely the date that the Solicitor General’s
brief was due—to clear the way for the INS to assert a contrary interpretation before the Supreme
Court.”).
123. See Taylor, supra note 110, at 273–74.
124. See, e.g., Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 596–97 (A.G. 2019) (overturning Board
case law that family can establish a particular social group); In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G.
2018) (overturning a BIA precedential decision in In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014),
that victims of domestic violence can establish a particular social group).
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immigration judges’ independence by creating categories of asylum claims
to presumptively deny.125 These efforts aimed to ensure that fewer people
could qualify for asylum.126 New case law implemented by Attorney General
Sessions also ensured that more asylum-seekers could suffer summary
deportation orders before the full adjudication of their claims.127 New case
law and policy aiming to reduce asylum eligibility also leads to more
detention given recent Board case law permitting immigration judges to find
those with weak asylum claims to be a presumptive flight risks in bond
hearings.128
There are other examples of the DOJ asserting control over immigration
adjudicators. A “gag rule,” refusing to allow immigration judges to speak to
the public has become the subject of First Amendment litigation.129
125. See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable
Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264 (June 15, 2020); Letter from Round Table of Former Immigration
Judges to Lauren Alder Reid, Assistant Dir., Off. of Pol’y, Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev. and Maureen
Dunn, Chief, Div. of Humanitarian Affs., Off. of Pol’y & Strategy 13 (July 13, 2020) (on file with
the Round Table of Former Immigration Judges) (“The proposed regulations short-circuit legal
analysis of an asylum applicant’s claim in particularly dangerous ways, by providing a checklist of
groups that would be ‘generally’ insufficient to establish a particular social group under the refugee
definition in order to provide uniformity and save Court time.”). The final rule, which was published
in December 2020 and would become effective January 2021, was enjoined by a federal district
court. See Pangea Legal Svcs v. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec’y, __F. Supp. 3d __, 2021 WL 75756,
*7 (N.D. Ca. Jan. 8, 2021).
126. See Jeffrey S. Chase, Taking a Sledgehammer to Asylum, OPS./ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L.
(June 23, 2020), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/6/23/taking-a-sledgehammer-toasylum.
127. Attorney General Sessions reversed Board case law that required immigration judges to
hear testimony from an asylum applicant even if the applicant had not made out a prima facie case
for asylum prior to the testimony. See Jeffrey S. Chase, Are Summary Denials Coming to
Immigration
Court?,
OPS./ANALYSIS
ON
IMMIGR.
L.
(June
24,
2018),
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/6/24/are-summary-denials-coming-to-immigrationcourt. Attorney General Sessions further announced in A-B- that immigration judges need not
examine the remaining elements of an asylum claim if there is one flaw in the case. Id. Former
immigration judge Jeffrey Chase noted that these two cases reminded immigration judges that they
could speed up deportation orders by refusing to permit more testimony, which would assist in their
production quotas because they could complete cases more quickly. Id.; see also supra Part I.A.
(describing the 2018 proposal for individual production quotas on immigration judges).
128. See Matter of R-A-V-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 803, 806–07 (BIA 2020) (upholding an
immigration judge’s bond denial based on flight risk and reasoning that “for various reasons,
eligibility for asylum can be difficult to establish, and an Immigration Judge may consider an alien’s
circumstances in determining how likely it is that his application for relief will ultimately be
approved.”); Jeffrey S. Chase, BIA: “Lock Them Up!”, OPS./ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L. (Apr. 6,
2020), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2020/4/6/bia-lock-them-up (critiquing R-A-V-P- by
stating, “[t]he question isn’t whether the respondent will be granted asylum; it’s whether his
application for asylum will provide enough impetus for him to appear for his hearings relating to
such relief. From my experience both as an attorney and an immigration judge, the answer in this
case is yes.”).
129. Jacqueline Thomsen, Immigration Judges Sue DOJ, Alleging Unconstitutional Gag on
Speech, NAT’L L.J. (July 1, 2020), https://www.naij-usa.org/images/uploads/newsroom/
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Previously, immigration judges regularly spoke to audiences such as law
students and practicing lawyers to discuss immigration law and procedures,
giving a short disclaimer that their views did not represent those of their
agency.130 This ended when EOIR set forth a policy that required the judges
to seek permission from the agency director and then repeatedly refused such
permission, silencing judges during a time when they could provide input on
rapidly-changing immigration laws and procedures.131 This policy ensured
that the judges could not publicly express dissent about the agency’s
immigration agenda.132
An interim rule announced in August 2019,133 which became final in
early November 2020, grants adjudication authority to the EOIR director—
an appointee of the Attorney who directly reports to the Deputy Attorney
General.134 The NAIJ has critiqued this rule because it permits the EOIR
director to “unilaterally rewrite immigration law with the issuance of
precedential cases, without even the internal checks in place for the
certification process that apply to the Attorney General.”135 This regulation
allows a political appointee to write precedential case law that immigration
judges and Board members are bound to follow, thus putting in in place a
mechanism that permits top political actors at DOJ to substitute their own
views for that of the supposedly independent adjudicators.136
The EOIR director, amid the financial crisis brought on by the COVID19 pandemic, offered to buy out Board members appointed before the Trump
2020.07.01.01.pdf. EOIR is undertaking full review of the agency’s policy regarding judges
speaking in public, which has put the litigation on hold. Knight First Amendment Institute at
Columbia University, Lawsuit: National Association of Immigration Judges v. McHenry (last
visited May 28, 2021), https://knightcolumbia.org/cases/naij-v-mchenry.
130. Cristian Farias, The Trump Administration is Gagging America’s Immigration Judges,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/immigrationjudges-first-amendment/607195/.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Organization of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,537 (Aug.
26, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1001, 1003, 1292).
134. See Organization of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 69,465
(Nov. 3, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1001, 1003, 1292); Abigail Hauslohner, New Rule
Gives Trump Administration More Discretion to Change Asylum Law, WASH. POST (Aug. 23, 2019,
7:29 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/new-rule-gives-trump-administrationmore-discretion-to-change-asylum-law/2019/08/23/5f09efca-c5c7-11e9-b5e454aa56d5b7ce_story.html.
135. The State of Judicial Independence and Due Process in U.S. Immigration Courts: Hearing
before Subcomm. on Immigr. & Citizenship of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 8 (2020)
(statement of J. A. Ashley Tabaddor, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigr. J.),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU01/20200129/110402/HHRG-116-JU01-WstateTabaddorA-20200129.pdf.
136. See id.
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administration, proposing financial incentives if they retired or resigned.137
The American Immigration Lawyers Association critiqued this as an attempt
to replace existing Board members with new Board members who would
have higher asylum denial rates.138 Although none of the existing Board
members took the offer, it represents another example of politics playing a
role in deciding who will be an immigration adjudicator.139 It is yet another
example of how the structure of the immigration adjudication system—with
adjudicators as employees of the DOJ—can impact who becomes an
adjudicator and thus control the decisions they make.140
In August 2020, the EOIR proposed new rules that would eliminate
procedural devices that immigration adjudicators use to benefit noncitizens,
such as sua sponte reopening authority, BIA remands to consider new
evidence, and administrative closure.141 Sua sponte reopening authority
gives immigration judges or Board members the option to reopen a case even
when a noncitizen has not met requirements such as the time or numerical
limits on a motion to reopen.142 BIA remand authority permits the Board to
remand when new evidence or relief becomes available while a case is on
appeal.143 Administrative closure authority allows an immigration judge to
take a case off of the court’s regular docket, typically because an application
is pending before the Citizenship and Immigration Services agency and that
application, if granted, would provide new relief for a noncitizen in
immigration court.144 Although they have been preliminarily enjoined by a

137. Tanvi Misra, DOJ memo offered to buy out immigration board members, ROLL CALL (May
27, 2020, 5:04 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/05/27/doj-memo-offered-to-buy-outimmigration-board-members/.
138. Id.; see also Press Release, Am. Immigr. Law. Ass’n, EOIR Director Attempts to Buy Out
Remaining Board Members to Solidify Control of Immigration Courts, AILA Doc. No. 20052830
(May 28, 2020), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2020/eoir-director-attempts-tobuy-out-remaining-.
139. See Misra, supra note 137; see also supra Part I.A. (describing politicized hiring of
immigration judges under Attorney General Ashcroft).
140. See Misra, supra note 137.
141. Appellate Procedures and Decisional Finality in Immigration Proceedings; Administrative
Closure, 85 Fed. Reg. 52,491, 52,491–52,506 (Aug. 26, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003,
1240).
142. Am. Immigr. Coun., Practice Advisory: The Basics of Motions to Reopen EOIR-Issued
Removal Orders 2–3 (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
sites/default/files/practice_advisory/the_basics_of_motions_to_reopen_eoir-issued_removal_
orders_practice_advisory.pdf.
143. Aruna Sury, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Practice Advisory: Motions before the BIA
2-3 (March 2020), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/motions_with_bia-final.pdf.
144. Nat’l Immigr. Just. Cntr., Practice Advisory: The Return of Administrative Closure 1–3
(July 2020), https://immigrantjustice.org/for-attorneys/legal-resources/file/practice-advisoryreturn-administrative-closure.
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federal district court,145 these proposed rules present yet another attack on
adjudicators’ independence, as they reduce the flexibility and discretion
immigration judges have to use procedural mechanisms to improve a
noncitizen’s chances of success in a removal hearing.146
The EOIR also issued a press release boasting about increases in
deportation orders during the Trump administration, apparently unconcerned
that, as the agency housing the adjudicators, it should at least appear to be
impartial.147 Meanwhile, Board members, answering only to only one
master, have gone so far as to defy a remand order by a federal appeals court,
describing the federal court’s decision as incorrect because the Attorney
General said so.148
These systemic problems with a biased immigration adjudication
system have become the subject of recent federal court litigation. In
December 2019, immigrants’ rights organizations brought a lawsuit alleging
violations under the U.S. Constitution, Immigration and Nationality Act, and
Administrative Procedure Act, which gave rise to a biased immigration
adjudication system.149 In July 2020, the federal district court presiding over
the suit allowed the case to proceed beyond a motion to dismiss for the
plaintiffs’ claim that the administrative of the immigration courts violates the
immigration statute’s “impartial adjudicator” requirement, recognizing that
there is “at least plausible evidence of systemic bias” in the immigration
adjudication system.150
The many examples explained in this Section show how frail an
immigration judges’ independence is, especially when it comes to the
important question of determining physical liberty from detention. A recent
study examining immigration judges’ bond decisions from 2001 through
145. See Centro De La Raza v. EOIR, 2021 WL 916804, at *1 (N. D. Ca. Mar. 10, 2021).
146. See Emily Creighton, Department of Justice Proposes New Limit to the Board of
Immigration
Appeals’
Power,
A M.
IMMIGR.
COUNCIL
(Aug.
25,
2020),
https://immigrationimpact.com/2020/08/25/board-immigration-appeals-2020-rule/#.X1dol_lKjIV.
147. See Marouf, supra note 4, at 711–12; Jeffrey S. Chase, The Need for an Independent
Immigration
Court,
OPS./ANALYSIS
ON
IMMIGR.
L.
(Aug.
17,
2017),
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2017/8/17/the-need-for-an-independent-immigration-court.
148. Baez-Sanchez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1033, 1035 (7th Cir. 2020) (“What happened next beggars
belief. The Board of Immigration Appeals wrote, on the basis of a footnote in a letter the Attorney
General issued after our opinion, that our decision is incorrect.”).
149. See Complaint at 52–61, Las Americas Immigr. Advoc. Ctr. v. Trump (No. 3:19-cv-2051),
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/documents/ecf_1_las_americas_v._trump_no._19-cv02051-sb_d._or.pdf.
150. Las Americas Immigr. Advoc. Ctr., 475 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1201, 1215 (D. Or. 2020). As
evidence of such bias, the court cited the unusually high rates of asylum denials in some immigration
courts, the case completion goals, and statements made by Trump administration Attorneys General
suggesting that asylum seekers are “‘breaking into this country’ and ‘exploiting’ the process,’”
while making “baseless [asylum] claims.” Id. at 1214 (alteration in original).
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2019 suggested that the current president in power, not the president whose
Attorney General appointed the judge, was the key indicator of outcome.151
In bond decisions, noncitizens fared worse in the Trump administration than
in the Obama or George W. Bush administrations.152
One can be optimistic that all of these attacks on immigration
adjudicators’ independence will die down in the Biden administration.153
However, the Biden administration has not prioritized reform to the
immigration adjudication system, and EOIR is still primarily staffed by
Trump appointees.154 The 300 immigration judges appointed during the
Trump administration increased the asylum denial rate from 50 percent
during the Obama years to 72 percent during the Trump years.155
Furthermore, assigning important liberty decisions to an agent of the
prosecutor, regardless of the politics of that prosecutor, is a system that must
be fixed. To use the cautionary words of Gerald Neuman, “[t]he ability to
determine the scope of one’s own authority . . . is too great a power to place
in the hands that already wield the sword.”156
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF ARTICLE III JUDGES IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION
DECISIONS
This Part describes how, in the modern era of immigration detention,
Article III judges have played a significant role in immigration detention
decisions. Despite efforts by Congress to curtail Article III judges’
jurisdiction, Article III courts, in one way or another, have continued to
monitor immigration detention. For immigration detainees, the Supreme
Court has at times been their hero, vindicating the right to physical liberty.
At other times it has been their villain, allowing executive officers to play an
151. See Kim & Semet, Presidential Ideology and Immigrant Detention, supra note 13, at 1885–
91. The authors acknowledge that their study did not control for factors that could impact the
outcomes, such as the individual circumstances of the noncitizen, the demographic characteristics
of the immigration judges, changes in migration patterns, sociopolitical or socioeconomic contexts,
geographic factors, or actions by other actors such as Congress, federal courts, or the Board. Id. at
1866. The authors suggested future empirical research that would account for such factors. Id. at
1891.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 9 (proposing that immigration court reform should be a major
priority of a Biden administration); AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N, A Vision for America as a
Welcoming Nation: AILA Recommendations for the Future of Immigration, AILA Doc. No.
20110933, 6 (Nov. 10, 2020) (recommending the creation of an Article I immigration court that is
independent from the DOJ).
154. Gregory Chen, JustSecurity: Biden’s First 100 Days on Immigration: A Test of Leadership
(Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/75934/bidens-first-100-days-on-immigration-a-testof-leadership/.
155. Id.
156. Neuman, supra note 43, at 1024.
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outsized role in liberty decisions. In spite of these forces, lower Article III
courts have continued to play a significant role in deciding physical liberty,
refusing to simply assign such important decisions to immigration police and
prosecutors.
This Article’s omission of a more detailed history of immigration
detention157 does not suggest there was no judicial involvement in monitoring
immigration detention, particularly during the earliest years of federal
immigration regulation158 and when detention became a tool of social control
during the Red Scare.159 As of 1954, the official DOJ policy was to make
immigration detention the exception;160 this caused a 90% reduction in
immigration detention.161 During the next several decades, bail was the norm
for those undergoing deportation proceedings.162 Release on parole was also
the norm for those in exclusion proceedings because they were not “‘clearly
and beyond a doubt entitled to land,’” notwithstanding the statute’s mandate
to detain these individuals.163 This use of immigration detention as the
exception continued until the 1980s.164
A. Litigation Concerning Haitian Detainees
The 1980 Mariel boatlift marked what Jonathan Simon has described as
“part of a larger series of immigration flows during the 1980s that would
157. Daniel Wilsher and César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández have given more comprehensive
historical summaries of U.S. immigration detention law and policy. See generally CÉSAR
CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON: AMERICA’S OBSESSION WITH
LOCKING UP IMMIGRANTS (2019); WILSHER, supra note 18. Elliott Young also tells the history of
U.S. immigration detention with a focus on five stories that illustrate specific detention policies.
See generally ELLIOT YOUNG, FOREVER PRISONS: HOW THE UNITED STATES MADE THE WORLD’S
LARGEST IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM (2021).
158. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 launched a “habeas corpus mill,” where lower federal
courts frequently ruled in favor of the Chinese, who were challenging their exclusions. See Christian
G. Fritz, A Nineteenth Century “Habeas Corpus Mill”: The Chinese Before the Federal Courts in
California, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 347, 348 (1988); see generally LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH
AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 18 (1995).
159. Daniel Wilsher describes courts’ decisions limiting indefinite detention for those who could
not be deported because they were stateless due to borders shifting in the post-war period. See
WILSHER, supra note 18, at 29–34.
160. Address by Hon. Herbert Brownell, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, Humanizing the
Administration of the Immigration Law (Jan. 26, 1955), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/09/12/01-26-1955.pdf.
161. Will Maslow, Recasting our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV.
309, 360–61 (1956).
162. See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 58.
163. Jonathan Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age, 10 Public Culture 577, 581 (1998); see also
8 U.S.C. § 12251225(b)(1)(B)(IV) (statute mandating detention for “arriving aliens”); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5) (statute providing for parole).
164. Simon, supra note 163, at 578-79.
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transform the face of immigration to the United States.”165 Previously, those
seeking to enter the United States without permission were primarily
Mexican, and they typically accepted deportation once apprehended rather
than seeking asylum.166 But the new illegal entrants of the 1980s, hailing
from the Caribbean and Central America, raised colorable claims under the
recently-enacted Refugee Act.167 The INS deemed these new refugees
dangerous and undesirable, yet the Refugee Act removed the INS’s discretion
to summarily exclude them.168 The Reagan administration’s response was
more detention and fewer grants of parole to arriving asylum-seekers, a
practice intended to deter future migrants.169 According to Attorney General
William French Smith, “[d]etention of aliens seeking asylum was necessary
to discourage people like the Haitians from setting sail in the first place.”170
A class of detainees sued, claiming that the new parole policy did not
follow the proper administrative law procedures and denied them equal
protection because it discriminated on the basis of race and national origin. 171
A federal district court decided that the new policy violated the
administrative law requirement of notice and comment and ordered the
release of 1,700 class members.172 After this order, the INS promulgated new
regulations that complied with its obligations under the Administrative
Procedure Act, and many were released under the new regulations.173 On
appeal, the Supreme Court, in the 1985 case Jean v. Nelson,174 decided that
the statute and new regulations required nondiscrimination in the
consideration of parole; the Court did not reach the equal protection claim.175
165. Id. at 582.
166. Id.
167. Id.; see also Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
168. Simon, supra note 163, at 582–83.
169. Id. at 583 (“The new imprisonment policy was aimed at substituting the deterrent of the
prison for the removal discretion lost to the Refugee Act.”); see also Louis v. Nelson 544 F. Supp.
973, 979–81 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (discussing President Reagan’s adoption of the federal task force’s
recommendation to use detention as deterrence, and stating that “[t]he policy was designed to deal
with another Mariel type situation, regardless of the nationality or number of the arriving aliens”).
170. MARK DOW, AMERICAN GULAG: INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS 7 (2004).
171. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 849 (1985).
172. Id. at 850.
173. Id. at 850.
174. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
175. Id. at 854–55, 857. Hiroshi Motomura describes the Jean case as an example where the
Court applied “phantom norms,” whereby important constitutional rights are realized through
statutory interpretation. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547–49 (1990).
The Court did not reach the constitutional question of whether the parole policy violated equal
protection, which would have required it to either accept or reject past holdings that the political
branches have plenary power over immigration decisions. See id. at 547; see also Jean, 472 U.S.
at 868–81 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (reaching the constitutional issue and deciding that, contrary to
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One lesson that can be gleaned from the Jean litigation is that federal
courts became more involved in scrutinizing executive officers’ parole
decisions, causing the INS to recalibrate its parole policies.176 Even if the
abuse of discretion standard of review was quite deferential to INS officers,177
it demonstrated a federal court monitoring individual decisions about
immigration detainees’ physical liberty.178 As Jonathan Simon writes,
detention became the source of rights, notwithstanding the plenary power that
caused courts to give immense deference to the political actors in this
context.179 Ironically, the judiciary’s invocation of some rights for even the
most rights-less (those who had never legally entered the United States)180
may have prompted the executive branch to interdict Haitian refugees on the
high seas to prevent them from reaching U.S. territory and jails, where they
had access to lawyers and the protections of the Constitution.181
B. Litigation Concerning the 1996 Detention Laws
Congress prioritized detention as social control in the late 1980s and
1990s, which César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández describes as part of a
broader effort to incarcerate more people of color in the war on drugs.182 A
series of legislative experiments183 led to the 1996 enactment of the
mandatory detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).184 This statute completely
the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, aliens who have not been admitted to the United States do have
constitutional rights).
176. See Jean, 472 U.S. at 850 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1985); 47 Fed. Reg. 30,044 (1982), as
amended, 47 Fed. Reg. 46,494 (1982)).
177. The Eleventh Circuit determined that, on remand, the District Court should examine
individual parole decisions to determine whether the INS officers could advance “facially legitimate
and bona fide reason[s]” for denying parole. Jean, 472 U.S. at 853 (quoting Jean v. Nelson, 727
F.2d. 957, 977 (11th Cir. 1984)).
178. On remand, the District Court was to consider whether the INS “made individualized
determinations of parole” and “exercised this broad discretion under the statutes and regulations
without regard to race or national origin.” Id. at 857.
179. See Simon, supra note 163, at 600.
180. See, e.g., WILSHER, supra note 18, at 61 (“[Mezei] revealed the full extent of the aliens [sic]
power to create essentially ‘political’ prisoners detained outside the framework of legal rules even
during peacetime.”).
181. See Simon, supra note 163, at 600; see also Sale v. Haitian Cntrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155,
160–70 (1993) (describing the history leading up to the Executive Order that required the Coast
Guard to interdict Haitians on the high seas and return them to Haiti).
182. See García Hernández, supra note 18, at 1360–79.
183. Holper, Beast of Burden, supra note 20, at 81–87 (chronicling the set of laws leading up to
the mandatory detention statute, all of which required the detainee in a crime-related class to bear
the burden of proving lack of dangerousness or flight risk).
184. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 303, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-585 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226).
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removed immigration judge review of bond for noncitizens removable for
terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility and deportability, noncitizens
inadmissible for crime-related reasons, and noncitizens deportable due to
multiple crimes involving moral turpitude, firearms offenses, aggravated
felonies, drug crimes.185 No longer would the habeas court oversee bond
decisions made by executive officials if proceedings became prolonged, in
contrast to the 1952 provisions.186 Also gone was any six-month limitation
on detention following a final order of removal,187 which had been included
in earlier immigration statutes out of recognition that indefinite detention
would be unconstitutional.188 Instead, the statute gave discretion to INS
officials over all post-order detention decisions, with no judicial role
anticipated.189
Congress also made all discretionary decisions related to detention
unreviewable by Article III courts. 190 This was part of a broader
185. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000). Only in cases of witness protection can an immigration
judge decide whether to release a noncitizen in these categories on bond. Id.
186. See Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 477, sec. 242(a), 66
Stat. 209 (1952) (requiring judicial oversight through habeas corpus when the “Attorney General is
not proceeding with such reasonable dispatch as may be warranted by the particular facts and
circumstances in the case of any alien to determine deportability”); see also IIRIRA, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, § 306(a)(2), 110 Stat. 3009-607 (1996) (removing this portion of the 1952
language).
187. See David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The
Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 61 (2001).
188. See Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1011. The Senate
Report for the Hobbs Act, which provides the legislative history of what became the Internal
Security Act of 1950 (“ISA”), stated:
[t]he bill, as it passed the House of Representatives, provided power in the Attorney
General to indefinitely detain deportable aliens in certain cases. This provision in the bill
as it passed the House of Representatives appears to present a constitutional question.
The committee, without undertaking to pass on the constitutionality of this provision, has
decided to delete the provision and to provide in its stead penal provisions to be invoked
by judicial process against deportable aliens in the subversive, criminal, and immoral
classes who fail to depart from the United States.
S. REP. NO. 81-2239, at 8–9 (1950) (facilitating deportation of aliens); see also Carlson v. Landon,
342 U.S. 524, 540 (1952) (referring to the legislative history of the Hobbs Act as providing such
history for the ISA, since it contained almost identical language). The 1952 INA retained the sixmonth limit on detention following a deportation order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1952).
189. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)(1996). David Martin discusses the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) version of the statute, which would have mandated detention of all
noncitizens convicted of an aggravated felony. See Martin, supra note 187, at 63–67. The IIRIRA
version gave discretion to the INS to release those who could not be deported under an order of
supervision, but also added that persons with status violations would also be subjected to the postorder removal statute. Id. at 67. Thus, this statute now applied to ninety-seven percent of
noncitizens ordered removed. Id.
190. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2000). Section 1226(e) was enacted with IIRIRA and reads: “The
Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be
subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this
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Congressional agenda to remove many immigration questions from review
by Article III courts, 191 especially discretionary decisions.192 These efforts
ironically resulted in more immigration cases being reviewed by federal
courts, since new questions of jurisdiction created its own subset of
litigation.193 This statute further limited the role the Supreme Court had
assigned to federal judges when it held in the 1952 case Carlson v. Landon194
that there was no right to bail in deportation proceedings.195 While the
Carlson court upheld the Attorney General’s authority to make discretionary
bail decisions and to delegate these decisions to his subordinates, the Court
also held that these decisions were subject to abuse-of-discretion review in
federal court.196 Congress later removed even this limited role for Article III
courts.197
The first of the 1996 detention statutes to reach the Supreme Court was
the statute dealing with post-removal order detention. In Zadvydas v.
Davis,198 the Court decided whether the INS could indefinitely detain lawful
permanent residents who had been ordered deported because of criminal
convictions, yet were either stateless or from a country that would not
repatriate them.199 The Court interpreted the post-order removal statute to
permit detention for only six months (finding this limit in the 1952 version),
after which the detainee would be released if deportation was not
foreseeable.200 By applying due process norms that apply to other types of
civil detention, Zadvydas stands as a high-water mark for the Court’s
recognition of constitutional rights for those detained by the immigration
section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or
parole.” Id.
191. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
229 (2007).
192. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (“AADC”), 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999)
(“[M]any provisions of IIRIRA are aimed at protecting the Executive’s discretion from the courts—
indeed, that can fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation.”); Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress,
Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2583 (1998).
193. See Family, supra note 110, at 583 (“The federal courts, perhaps counterintuitively given
the cuts in jurisdiction, have also seen huge increases in the numbers of immigration appeals filed
in the courts of appeals.”); id. at 585 (noting that “stripping judicial review creates litigation over
the court’s jurisdiction.”).
194. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
195. See id. at 540–41.
196. See id.
197. See García Hernández, supra note 18, at 1355 (“To an observer of the modern immigration
detention apparatus, the [Carlson] Court’s reference to discretion sounds quaint, because much of
that discretion was eliminated in a series of policy practices and statutory enactments beginning in
the early 1980s and culminating in 1996.”).
198. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
199. Id. at 684.
200. Id. at 701.
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authorities.201 The Court stated, “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at
the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”202 Yet, the
Court did not go so far as to strike down the statute as unconstitutional.
Instead, the Court interpreted the statute to allow release if the government
could not show deportation was foreseeable six months after a final order of
removal.203 The Court thus resurrected the prior versions of the statute that
limited post-order detention to six months.204
Meanwhile, multiple courts of appeals held that the statute mandating
detention during removal proceedings violated Due Process,205 and even the
government believed that it was likely to lose when the issue reached the
Supreme Court, especially when applying the Zadvydas decision.206 Yet, the
Court upheld the statute against a due process challenge in the 2003 case of
Demore v. Kim.207 As Margaret Taylor writes, this was the first immigration
case to reach the Supreme Court after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, so the Court was bowing to executive authority to detain noncitizens

201. See id. at 690 (comparing indefinite immigration detention to civil commitment, where the
government must bear the burden of proving that special circumstances, “such as a harm-threatening
mental illness, outweigh[] the ‘individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint.’”) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997)).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 701. Justice Breyer’s opinion in Zadvydas signaled an important constitutional ruling;
it stands as an excellent example of Hiroshi Motomura’s “phantom constitutional norms,” where
courts undermine the plenary power through statutory interpretation. See Motomura, supra note
175, at 549. The manner of interpretation proved to be instrumental to providing a path to freedom
for some Mariel Cubans who were never admitted to the United States, yet were ordered excluded
due to criminal convictions and could not be repatriated. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386
(2005). The Court in 2005 applied its Zadvydas holding to inadmissible Cubans, despite the
government’s arguments that because the Cubans had never been admitted, they should not benefit
from the Zadvydas holding. Id. at 382–86. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reasoned that
because the same statute applied to those who had been deported and those who had never been
admitted to the United States, the Cubans could benefit from the Court’s Zadvydas holding. Id.
204. See Martin, supra note 187, at 73 (“In a move not much seen since Warren Court days, it
laid down precise numerical guidance for habeas courts. . . . This [six-month] time period was
expressly borrowed from the long-standing pre-1996 statutory framework for deportable aliens.”).
205. See, e.g., Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 537 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510 (2003); Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 227 (4th Cir. 2002), abrogated, Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510 (2003); Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2002), vacated, Weber v. Phu
Chang Hoang, 538 U.S. 1010 (2003); Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 314 (3d Cir. 2001), abrogated,
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
206. As Margaret Taylor writes, the government viewed the Demore v. Kim case as one “[t]he
INS wouldn’t mind losing.” Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to
Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343 (2005). Also, several former INS employees
signed an amicus brief in Demore v. Kim, supporting Mr. Kim in his argument that mandatory
detention violated Due Process. Id.
207. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
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deemed a threat.208 The Demore Court reasoned that because such periods of
detention were brief, a categorical rule of detention without an individualized
hearing was constitutionally permissible.209 Justice Kennedy warned in his
concurrence, though, that if mandatory detention becomes unreasonably
prolonged, it no longer serves the statute’s goals.210
C. Litigation Concerning Prolonged Detention and Procedural
Protections in Bond Hearings
Following Demore, multiple courts held that once mandatory detention
became unreasonably prolonged, detainees were entitled to a bond hearing.211
Detention lengths were quite staggering: for a class of detainees challenging
their prolonged detention without periodic (or in some cases any) bond
hearings, detention lengths averaged between 346–427 days, with some
lasting up to 1,585 days.212 Although the statute no longer contained the 1952
allowance for judicial involvement if the government did not act with
“reasonable dispatch” in the proceedings,213 courts still saw themselves in the
role of monitoring detention without a bond hearing if detention during
proceedings lasted too long.
What is more, Article III courts, once analyzing whether detainees had
a right to a bond hearing, also began to dictate the contours of that bond

208. Taylor, supra note 206, at 345.
209. Demore, 538 U.S. at 529.
210. Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reasoning that a detainee “could be entitled to an
individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention
became unreasonable or unjustified.”) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684–86 (2001)).
211. See, e.g., Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1212–13 (11th Cir. 2016), vacated, 890
F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases); Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 494 (1st Cir. 2016),
withdrawn, Nos. 14-1270, 14-1803, 14-1823, 2018 WL 4000993 (1st Cir. May 11, 2018) (“The case
before us tests the assumption upon which Demore was based, and asks whether Congress may
employ categorical, mandatory detention for ‘the period necessary for removal proceedings’ when
that period turns out not to be so ‘brief’ after all.”).
212. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1079–85 (9th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 830
(2018). The Rodriguez class was subdivided into three subclasses. Id. at 1078. For those subject
to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C.§ 1226(c), the average length of detention was 427 days,
with the longest-detained class member confined for 1,585 days (and counting). Id. at 1079. The
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) subclass members had “been detained for as long as 831 days, and for an average
of 346 days each.” Id. at 1081. “At the time petitioners generated their report, [one 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a) subclass member] had been detained for 1,234 days with no definite end in sight.” Id. at
1085.
213. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1952) (“Any court of competent jurisdiction shall have authority
to review or revise any determination of the Attorney General concerning detention, release on
bond, or parole pending final decision of deportability upon a conclusive showing in habeas corpus
proceedings that the Attorney General is not proceeding with such reasonable dispatch as may be
warranted by the particular facts and circumstances in the case of any alien to determine
deportability.”).
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hearing.214 This made immigration bond hearings look more like bail
hearings for pretrial detainees.215 In some cases, Article III courts, exercising
their equitable powers under the habeas statute, held their own bond hearings
or simply ordered release.216 In other cases, courts closely monitored how
immigration judges conducted the bond hearings that courts had ordered.
This typically arose when litigants did not believe that the immigration judge
properly followed the procedural requirements mandated by the courts.217
Article III courts also repeatedly ignored the “entry fiction” 218 that
purported to create a constitution-free zone for those stopped at the nation’s
borders.219 In case after case, noncitizens who were stopped at the border and
detained pending the presentation and appeal of an asylum claim invoked the

214. For example, courts determined that the government, not the detainee, should bear the
burden of proof at the bond hearings for which previously mandatory detainees were now eligible.
See, e.g., Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S.
Ct. 1260 (2018); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 2011). But see Sopo, 825
F.3d at 1220 (holding that those detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for a prolonged period such that
the statute should require a bond hearing do not deserve more process than those detained under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a), who must bear the burden of proof according to regulation and Board precedent).
Courts also decided that the standard of proof should be clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g.,
Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “a clear and convincing
evidence standard of proof provides the appropriate level of procedural protection” in light of “the
substantial liberty interest at stake.”).
215. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2000) (requiring, when a pretrial detainee is charged with certain
enumerated offenses, that the government move for a detention hearing at which the government
must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the detainee is dangerous and that no conditions
can ensure the safety of the community).
216. See, e.g., Flores-Powell v. Chadbourne, 677 F. Supp. 2d 455, 476–77 (D. Mass. 2010)
(collecting cases of district courts that held their own bond hearings pursuant to equitable habeas
powers).
217. See, e.g., Singh, 638 F.3d at 1203–04 (evaluating procedures used in bond hearing mandated
by the court’s earlier decision in Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir.
2008)); Hechavarria v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 239–43 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (granting a motion
to enforce the judgment when the immigration judge did not apply the clear and convincing burden
of proof to the government in a court-ordered bond hearing).
218. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 157, at 25. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández
describes the origins of the entry fiction in immigration law. See id. at 23–25. This legal fiction
allowed arriving migrants to land on U.S. soil, relieving steamship companies of holding them on
ships while immigration officers vetted them using the growing list of exclusion grounds. Id. The
legal fiction permitted this arrangement, but excluded the migrants from claiming any constitutional
rights that normally would accompany presence on U.S. soil. Id.
219. See, e.g., Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 409 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The government
first contends in these appeals that . . . the detention of excludable aliens cannot raise constitutional
concerns because such detention ‘does not implicate the Fifth Amendment.’ We could not more
vehemently disagree. Excludable aliens—like all aliens—are clearly protected by the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”) (citation omitted); see also id. at 410 (“The fact
that excludable aliens are entitled to less process, however, does not mean that they are not at all
protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”); Chi Thon Ngo
v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 396 (3d Cir. 1999).
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Due Process Clause, claiming a constitutional right to be free from prolonged
detention while their cases were pending.220 Such courts were careful to limit
the Supreme Court’s 1953 holding in Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex. rel. Mezei221 to
its facts, holding that the Due Process Clause was only inapplicable because
the detainee was ordered excluded for national security reasons. 222 Thus,
even those with the fewest statutory and constitutional rights to be free still
managed to convince Article III judges that the constitution required an
individualized bond hearing when detention became unreasonably
prolonged.223
Finally, Article III courts began to examine the quality of the bond
hearings that occur pursuant to the general bond statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Here, Article III courts repeatedly found immigration judges’ bond hearings
constitutionally defective. For example, courts have held that: (1) detainees
220. See, e.g., Tuser v. Rodriguez, 370 F. Supp. 3d 435, 443 (D.N.J. 2019); Jamal v. Whitaker,
358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 857 (D. Minn. 2019); De Ming Wang v. Brophy, No. 17-CV-6263-FPG, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1826, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019); Perez v. Decker, No. 18-cv-5279 (VEC),
2018 WL 3991497, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2018) (collecting cases from the Southern District
of New York); Ahad v. Lowe, 235 F. Supp. 3d 676, 682 (M.D. Pa. 2017); Maldonado v. Macias,
150 F. Supp. 3d 788, 812 (W.D. Tex. 2015). But see Poonjani v. Shanahan, 319 F. Supp. 3d 644,
649 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“[B]ecause the immigration statutes at issue here do not authorize a bond
hearing, Mezei dictates that due process does not require one here.”).
221. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). In Mezei, the petitioner was ordered excluded under the Passport Act
and its implementing regulations yet forced to remain detained on Ellis Island because no other
nation would receive him. Id. at 205–06. The Court ruled that his continued exclusion and detention
without a hearing did not deprive him of any statutory or constitutional right, because the
constitution did not apply to him. Id. at 215–16. The Mezei decision suffered serious critique, even
at the time, owing to the Court’s determination that the constitutional right of Due Process did not
even apply. See, e.g., WILSHER, supra note18, at 61; Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and
Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
933, 982–84 (1995) (describing post-decision public critique and congressional efforts that
ultimately led to the Attorney General releasing Mezei on parole); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power
of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1362, 1392 (1953).
222. See, e.g., Kouadio v. Decker, 352 F. Supp. 3d 235, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Mezei was
decided in the interest of national security, against a petition whose detention was authorized under
‘emergency regulations promulgated pursuant to the Passport Act.’”) (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at
214–15); id. at 240 (“It is well-established that national security concerns affect the scope of due
process. . . . The world remains threatening to the United States’ interests, but we are far from the
dark climate of World War II and the Korean and Vietnamese wars. As the Sixth Circuit held en
banc, Mezei is limited to the national security context in which it was decided.”); see also RosalesGarcia, 322 F.3d at 413–14 (distinguishing Mezei from the case of a paroled Cuban who was
ordered excluded by stating that “the Mezei Court explicitly grounded its decision in the special
circumstances of a national emergency and the determination by the Attorney General that Mezei
presented a threat to national security”); id. at 414 (holding that Mezei was also distinguishable
because “the Court’s implicit conclusion in Mezei is eclipsed by the conclusion drawn from the
Salerno line of cases that the indefinite detention of excludable aliens does raise constitutional
concerns”).
223. See, e.g., Rosales-Garcia, 322 F.3d at 413–14; Kouadio, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 239–40.
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should not be required to bear the burden of proof;224 (2) the appropriate
standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence;225 (3) immigration judges
must consider alternatives to detention;226 (4) detainees should not suffer
detention merely because they are unable to pay the bond set by an
immigration judge;227 (5) judges must keep a contemporaneous record of the
hearings;228 and (6) judges must immediately state the reasons for a bond
denial (as opposed to writing post-hoc reasons for denial).229 In these cases,
government arguments that Article III courts have no role to play in
reviewing immigration judges’ and officers’ discretionary bond decisions
have proven unconvincing.230 In fact, because detainees presented these
arguments as procedural due process violations, it was necessary for the
detainees to show they were prejudiced by the procedures231—and that

224. See, e.g., Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 846, 854 (2d Cir. 2020); Dubon Miranda
v. Barr, 463 F. Supp. 3d 632, 646 (D. Md. 2020); Brito v. Barr, 415 F. Supp. 3d 258, 263 (D. Mass.
2019); Linares Martinez v. Decker, No. 18-CV-6527 (JMF), 2018 WL 5023946, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 17, 2018); Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 692 (D. Mass 2018).
225. See, e.g., Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 854–55; Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1204–05
(9th Cir. 2011); Linares Martinez, No. 18-CV-6527 (JMF), 2018 WL 5023946, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 17, 2018).
226. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 291–92 (9th Cir. 2017); Dubon-Miranda,
463 F. Supp. 3d 632 (D. Md. 2020); Brito v. Barr, 415 F. Supp. 3d 258, 263, 271 (D. Mass. 2019);
Abdi v. Nielson, 287 F. Supp. 3d 327, 333 (W.D.N.Y. 2018).
227. See Abdi, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 333.
228. See, e.g., Singh, 638 F.3d at 1200.
229. Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1173, 1178 (W.D. Wash.
2019) (granting a preliminary injunction for prompt bond hearings with several procedural
protections that are currently lacking in bond hearings conducted under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) for a
class of asylum-seekers who recently entered the United States and passed a credible fear interview).
230. See, e.g., Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 987 (“[8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)] does not, however, preclude
‘habeas jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law.’ . . . ’[C]laims that the
discretionary [bond] process itself was constitutionally flawed are cognizable in federal court on
habeas because they fit comfortably within the scope of § 2241.’” (quoting Singh, 638 F.3d at 1196,
1202)) (citations omitted) (alterations in original); Singh, 638 F.3d at 1202 (“Like § 1226(e),
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) restricts jurisdiction only with respect to the executive’s exercise of discretion.
It does not limit habeas jurisdiction over questions of law, . . . including ‘application of law to
undisputed facts, sometimes referred to as mixed questions of law and fact.’” (quoting Ramadan v.
Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2007))) (citations omitted); Linares Martinez, 2018 WL
5023946, at *4 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2018) (“One of [the government’s] arguments—that the Court
lacks jurisdiction to review Linares’s detention . . . —barely warrants scrutiny. It is well established
that Section 1226(e) . . . does not preclude judicial review of ‘[c]laims of constitutional infirmity in
the procedures followed at a bond hearing.’” (quoting Bogle v. DuBois, 236 F. Supp. 3d 820, 822
(S.D.N.Y. 2017)).
231. See, e.g., Singh, 638 F.3d at 1205; Maldonado-Velasquez v. Moniz, 274 F. Supp. 3d 11,
13–15 (D. Mass 2017) (declining to reach the issue of whether a misallocated burden of proof
violated the detainee’s due process rights because the detainee was not prejudiced by the error).

2021]TAKING LIBERTY DECISIONS AWAY FROM “IMITATION” JUDGES 1111
prejudice inquiry requires courts to analyze whether the result could have
been different with the proper procedures.232
D. COVID-19 Cases
When the COVID-19 pandemic caused worldwide closures, stay-athome orders, and health-expert-mandated social distancing, immigrant
advocates wondered what would happen to immigration detainees.233
Immigration detention sites were a tinderbox for spreading the virus,234 with
detainees sharing bedrooms, bathrooms, and dining spaces, while lacking
protective equipment or sanitizer. Detainees were further exposed to
numerous corrections staff.235
Again, Article III courts played an important role in monitoring the right
to liberty in these exigent circumstances. In one case, a federal district court
ordered U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) to conduct new
custody determinations for all of its detainees with risk factors that would
increase the detainees’ risk of serious illness or death if infected by COVID19.236 In other cases, federal courts granted injunctive relief, ordering ICE to
release certain vulnerable detainees237 or depopulate its jails.238

232. See Singh, 638 F.3d at 1205 (holding that the court applied the incorrect standard of proof
in a bond hearing, and that “the standard of proof could well have affected the outcome.”); Doe v.
Tompkins, No. 18-12266-PBS, 2019 WL 8437191, at *1–2 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2019) (holding that
placing the burden of proof on a detainee violated due process rights and that a different burden
allocation could have impacted the outcome).
233. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández & Carlos Moctezuma García, Close Immigration
Prisons Now, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/
opinion/coronavirus-immigration-prisons.html.
234. See Catherine E. Shoichet, Doctors Warn of ‘Tinderbox Scenario’ if Coronavirus Spreads
in
ICE
Detention,
CNN
(Mar.
20,
2020,
8:21
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/20/health/doctors-ice-detention-coronavirus/index.html.
235. See Decl. of Robert B. Greifinger, MD, Augusto v. Moniz, No. 1:20-cv-10685-ADB, Docket
No. 36 (D. Mass 2020) (on file with author).
236. See Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 445 F. Supp. 3d 709, 750 (C.D. Cal. 2020).
237. See, e.g., Coreas v. Bounds, 458 F. Supp. 3d 352, 360–61 (D. Md. 2020); Jeferson V.G. v.
Decker, No. 20-3644 (KM), 2020 WL 1873018, *3–9 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2020); Thakker v. Doll, 451
F. Supp. 3d 358, 365, 367, 369 (M.D. Pa. 2020); Basank v. Decker, 449 F. Supp. 3d 205, 213, 215
(S.D.N.Y. 2020); see also Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1065, 1066 (9th Cir. 2020) (ordering
sua sponte release of a noncitizen whose petition for review was pending before the court of appeals
“[i]n light of the rapidly escalating public health crisis, which public health authorities predict will
especially impact immigration detention centers”). But see Dawson v. Asher, 447 F. Supp. 3d 1047,
1048–49 (W.D. Wash. 2020) (denying a temporary restraining order seeking release of medically
vulnerable immigration detainees).
238. See, e.g., Roman v. Wolf, No. EDCV 20-00768 TJH (PVCx), 2020 WL 1952656, *9–12
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020); see also Savino v. Souza, 459 F. Supp. 3d 317, 320 (D. Mass. 2020)
(ordering ICE to test all detainees and staff at one detention facility and to not admit any more
immigration detainees to that facility).
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Article III courts also began to conduct their own bail hearings for
immigration detainees, taking the liberty decisions away from ICE officers
and immigration judges. A little-known doctrine permits Article III courts to
release a detainee on bail if there are extraordinary circumstances that make
the granting of bail necessary to make habeas effective.239 In several cases,
federal courts decided bail for immigration detainees using this doctrine.240
In some cases, the detainee sought an immigration court bond hearing in the
underlying habeas corpus petition, but it was unclear when that bond hearing
would happen due to immigration court delays caused by the pandemic.241
The Article III courts reasoned that the remedy sought by the habeas
petition—a bond hearing—would be rendered ineffective if the detainee was
not immediately released, since more time in custody meant greater
likelihood of infection, and possibly death, before an immigration court bond
hearing.242 Immigration detainees also sought release as a remedy to an
overpopulated detention center, arguing that their forced communal living in
a pandemic amounted to a due process violation.243 While courts sorted out
these substantial legal claims, they also considered bail for detainees, again
so that the remedy the detainees sought would not be rendered ineffective if
the detainees died from the virus before the case could be resolved in court.244
These cases demonstrate that the federal courts, not immigration judges,
became the guardians of freedom for immigration detainees when accessing
freedom was crucial for their physical safety. As one district court stated:
Our Constitution and laws apply equally to the most vulnerable among
us, particularly when matters of public health are at issue. This is true even
for those who have lost a measure of their freedom. If we are to remain the
civilized society we hold ourselves out to be, it would be heartless and
inhumane not to recognize Petitioners’ plight. And so we will act.245
The global pandemic exposed to the public the many flaws in the U.S.
immigration detention system, as there were over 12,000 reported virus cases

239. See Mapp v. Reno, 241 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2001).
240. See, e.g., Yanes v. Martin, 464 F. Supp. 3d 467, 475 (D.R.I. 2020); Gomes v. U.S. Dep’t
Homeland Sec., 460 F. Supp. 3d 132, 156 (D.N.H. 2020); Savino, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 322; Avendaño
Hernandez v. Decker, 450 F. Supp. 3d 443, 446–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Arana v. Barr, No. 19cv7924
(PGG) (DF), 2020 WL 1502039, at *1, *4 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 27, 2020); Coronel v. Decker, 449 F.
Supp. 3d 274, 289–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
241. See, e.g., Coronel, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 280, 286; Arana, No. 19cv7924 (PGG) (DF), 2020
WL 1502039, at *1.
242. Coronel, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 283.
243. See, e.g., Savino, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 327–31; Avendaño Hernandez, 450 F. Supp. 3d at 447;
Coronel, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 280, 285–87.
244. Coronel, 449 F. Supp. 3d at 287.
245. Thakker v. Doll, 451 F. Supp. 3d 358, 372 (M.D. Pa. 2020).
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in ICE detention.246 One solution was for Article III courts to step in and
make liberty decisions, taking those away from ICE prosecutors and
immigration judges.
E. Federal Courts Applying a Familiar Map
These examples of federal court involvement in protecting immigration
detainees’ rights demonstrate that federal courts have played a significant
role in custody decisions, even in the face of statutes attempting to limit their
jurisdiction. Why? The best explanation, offered by historians studying
judicial involvement in immigration detention and Chinese exclusion, is that
Article III courts have a familiar map onto which they must make sense of an
immigration case.247 For example, during the Chinese exclusion period,
lower federal judges hearing the cases harbored their own anti-Chinese
biases, and popular opinion was anti-Chinese.248 Yet, the judges applied
settled judicial doctrines such as the presumption of freedom and certain
evidentiary doctrines, knowing that they would suffer significant critique.249
Reflecting on the Red Scare, when courts considered the question of
indefinite detention for communists who could not be deported, Daniel
Wilsher describes how some judges still applied “the ‘old map’ of habeas
corpus” and the presumption of freedom in the new world of alien controls,
although these courts struggled with the decisions.250
Courts have honored the common law presumption of freedom, often
releasing immigration detainees on bail while they fought against exclusion
or deportation, even though this limited form of authorization overrode
Congress’ decision to exclude or deport such a person.251 The political
branches’ plenary power over deportation and exclusion decisions, which
told judges to stay out of the decisions, was in conflict with the common law
presumption of freedom—if detention was viewed as a necessary part of that
exclusion and deportation power.252 The solution for many judges was to

246. Isabel Niu, Emily Rhyne, and Aaron Byrd, How ICE’s Mishandling of Covid-19 Fueled
Outbreaks Around the Country, The New York Times (Apr. 25, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000007707896/immigration-detention-covid.html.
247. See, e.g., WILSHER, supra note 18, at 150; SALYER, supra note 158, at xvi.
248. See SALYER, supra note 158, at xvi, 18, 21.
249. See id. (discussing federal judges’ willingness to believe Chinese witnesses and documents
because the government frequently could not prove that they were not credible or fraudulent); see
also WILSHER, supra note 18, at 22 (describing a judge’s decision to limit detention post-exclusion
for a Chinese person whose ship had already departed as a “principled solution showing
considerable fortitude, given the hostile political environment.”).
250. See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 33–34.
251. See infra Part II; WILSHER, supra note 18, at xx.
252. See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 6–8.
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view detention as a separate legal issue.253 Detention could even be viewed
as a source of additional rights.254
To be sure, the Supreme Court has not always vindicated the rights of
immigration detainees. Perhaps the most damaging passage, repeated by the
Supreme Court during the Chinese Exclusion Era, the Cold War, and the
more recent War on Terror, is the statement that “[d]etention is necessarily a
part of this deportation procedure.”255 This doctrinal intertwining of
detention with the exclusion and deportation powers suggests that the
political branches’ power over immigration detention is also plenary.256 Yet,
a laser focus on these statements by the Supreme Court neglects the role that
lower federal courts have played in upholding the presumption of freedom
for immigration detainees.257 Lower courts, when asked to evaluate the

253. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 551 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (“A power to put in jail
because dangerous cannot be derived from a power to deport.”); Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v.
Meese, 934 F.2d 991, 1015 (9th Cir. 1990) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (critiquing as an “unwarranted
[judicial] leap” the majority’s “moving from the uncontroverted propositions that the political
branches have plenary authority over deciding whom to admit into the country and that such political
decisions are largely immune from judicial review, to the unsupportable conclusion that how it treats
those whom it detains while the deportation process is underway is likewise beyond judicial
review”); Cole, supra note 84, at 1038 (arguing that defenders of unchecked detention as part of the
deportation process “have confused the power to deport with the power to detain.”).
254. Jonathan Simon explains that detention provides additional rights. See Simon, supra note
163, at 600. Otherwise, the U.S. government would not have resorted to the extraordinary policy
of interdicting Haitian boats in the 1990s; the policy aimed to prevent the migrants from arriving on
U.S. territory, after which their detention in a U.S. jail would permit them to seek relief in federal
court. Id.
255. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (quoting Carlson, 342 U.S. at538) (alteration in
original); see, e.g., id. at 523 (“[T]his Court has recognized detention during deportation
proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process. As we said more than a
century ago, deportation proceedings ‘would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody
pending the inquiry into their true character.’” (quoting Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,
235 (1896))); Carlson, 342 U.S. at 538 (“Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation
procedure. Otherwise aliens arrested for deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United
States during the pendency of deportation proceedings.”).
256. See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 6.
257. See SALYER, supra note 158, at xv (discussing the intervention by federal district courts in
San Francisco in response to the Chinese Exclusion Acts, where these judges “played a more active
role, at least initially, a fact missed by legal scholars, perhaps because they have focused on the
Supreme Court and East Coast European immigrants.”). As an example of scholarship that has
focused mainly on the Supreme Court, Lenni Benson has argued that the judiciary repeatedly has
allowed immigration authorities to expand the use of immigration detention. Lenni B. Benson, As
Old as the Hills: Detention and Immigration, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 11, 15 (2010).
Summarizing the Supreme Court’s doctrine of immigration exceptionalism during the Chinese
Exclusion Acts and Red Scare, she observes that the Court has refused to hold immigration detention
to be an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. Id. at 17, 21–37. The only time the Court got close,
she argues, was in its 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, yet the Court did not reach the
constitutional question, thus not going far enough to recognize constitutional rights of immigration
detainees. Id. at 15–16.
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constitutionality of immigration detention in various contexts, have
repeatedly invoked the rights-granting language of Zadvydas and
distinguished Demore,258 demonstrating their willingness to guard the right
to physical liberty, even when the person in front of the court is not a citizen
or facing criminal charges.259 In fact, that lower federal courts have
vindicated immigration detainees’ rights, in spite of such harsh statements by
the Supreme Court and Congressional language that repeatedly attempts to
limit their jurisdiction, only suggests that the federal judiciary will continue
to play an active role in monitoring immigration detention.
Of course, one response that could be expected from the Supreme Court
is a reversion to the harshest version of the plenary power. This occurred
with the recent decision in DHS v. Thuraissigiam,260 where the Court
affirmed the Mezei rule that arriving aliens have no due process rights, and
even extended the rule to those who were physically within a U.S. border,
although only twenty-five yards inside of the border.261 As David Martin
warned decades ago:
Due process . . . threatens to become the kudzu vine of
constitutional law: allow it to take root and it soon takes over the
whole hillside . . . . [T]he Court often seems a lonely and perhaps
unconvincing machete-wielder, cutting back on the luxuriant
growth that appears continually to spring forth in the lower courts.
If the Court feels embattled in these efforts, the Knauff-Mezei
doctrine will appear increasingly attractive.262
One of the most instructive opinions about the lower courts’ willingness
to distinguish the harshest Supreme Court cases on immigration detention
came in 2015 from the Ninth Circuit. In Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriquez

258. See, e.g., Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 691 (D. Mass 2018) (“Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690
(2001))); id. at 692 (“But Demore is not applicable here because it involved criminal aliens subject
to mandatory detention. In contrast, this case involves a different statutory section, § 1226(a), which
permits release of non-criminal aliens pending their removal proceedings. The Supreme Court has
not yet determined what process is due when an immigration judge does hold an individualized
bond hearing for non-criminal aliens.”); Linares Martinez v. Decker, No. 18-CV-6527 (JMF), 2018
WL 5023946, at *2, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2018); Portillo v. Hott, 322 F. Supp. 3d 698, 703–06
(E.D. Va. 2018).
259. See, e.g., Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We are not persuaded by
the government’s argument that we should deviate from this principle and apply the lower
preponderance of the evidence standard because the liberty interest at stake here is less than for
people subject to an initial finding of removal or other types of civil commitment.”).
260. 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).
261. Id. at 1981–83.
262. David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political
Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 165, 188–89 (1983).
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III),263 the court interpreted immigration statutes that purported to mandate
immigration detention without a bond hearing. 264 The court interpreted the
statutes to provide a bond hearing every six months, in order to avoid the
constitutional problems that the statutes would otherwise present.265 The
court reviewed key Supreme Court decisions on immigration detention and
wrote:
Early cases [such as Carlson and Wong Wing v. United States266]
upholding immigration detention policies were a product of their
time . . . . Yet even these cases recognized some limits on
detention of non-citizens pending removal. Such detention may
not be punitive . . . and it must be supported by a legitimate
regulatory purpose. Under these principles, the Court authorized
the ‘detention or temporary confinement’ of Chinese-born noncitizens ‘pending the inquiry into their true character, and while
arrangements were being made for their deportation.’ . . .
Similarly, the Court approved detention of communists to limit
their ‘opportunities to hurt the United States during the pendency
of deportation proceedings.’ . . . The Court recognized, however,
that ‘purpose to injure could not be imputed generally to all aliens
subject to deportation.’ . . . Rather, if the Attorney General wished
to exercise his discretion to deny bail, he was required to do so at
a hearing, the results of which were subject to judicial review.267
On review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court, in its
2018 decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez,268 did not opine on the
constitutionality of prolonged immigration detention. The Jennings majority
held that the lower court was wrong to engage in statutory interpretation to
find such a right to a bond hearing and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to

263. 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015) (Rodriguez III), rev’d and rem’d, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138
S. Ct. 830 (2018)).
264. Id. at 1076.
265. Id.
266. The court here refers to Carlson v. Landon, in which the Court upheld the constitutionality
of a Congressional delegation of bail decisions to an executive branch official. 342 U.S. 524, 542–
44 (1952). The court also refers to Wong Wing, in which the Court invalidated the portion of the
1892 Geary Act that required a year at hard labor prior to the deportation of a Chinese national,
deeming it punishment that was deserving of the procedural protections of a criminal trial. 163 U.S.
228, 234–35 (1896). However, in dicta, the Court wrote that detention was a valid part of the
deportation process. Id. at 235 (“We think it clear that detention, or temporary confinement, as part
of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens would
be valid. Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if those accused could not be held in
custody pending the inquiry into their true character and while arrangements were being made for
their deportation.”).
267. Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1076.
268. 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
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determine the constitutional issue.269 In his dissent, Justice Breyer reasoned
that prolonged immigration detention without a bond hearing violated the
Due Process Clause.270 Time will tell how a majority of the Supreme Court
will assess the constitutional right to a bond hearing during removal
proceedings when detention has become prolonged; the only current
Supreme Court justice’s opinion on this issue is Justice Breyer’s Jennings
dissent.
This Part, together with Part I, demonstrates the very different decisionmaking maps used by Article III judges and immigration judges. Article III
courts frequently interpret the U.S. constitution; this provides an explanation
for why the presumption of freedom often has overridden immigration law’s
plenary power.271 Immigration judges, on the other hand, do not interpret the
constitution.272 They spend much of their time deciding applications for
relief from removal, where the applicant bears the burden of proof273 and
typically must beg for a favorable exercise of discretion.274 When an
immigration judge conducts a bond hearing, the expectation is also that the
detainee must beg for mercy.275 Yet, liberty should be for the detainee to
take, not beg for.276 To make matters worse, immigration judges work for a
law enforcement agency that has long had a public agenda of using detention
for social control and deterring future border crossers.277 Immigration judges
have been sent the message that they rule against the government at their own

269. Id. at 834–836.
270. Id. at 861–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
271. See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 6–8; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001)
(“But that power [the plenary power,] is subject to important constitutional limitations.”).
272. See Matter of C-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529, 532 (BIA 1992) (“[I]t is settled that the immigration
judge and [the BIA] lack jurisdiction to rule upon the constitutionality of the Act and the
regulations.”). But cf. Alina Das, Administrative Constitutionalism in Immigration Law, 98 B.U. L.
REV. 485, 491 (2018) (arguing that federal agencies like the Board of Immigration Appeals have
the power to decide constitutional issues and should utilize this power).
273. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A).
274. See generally Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and
Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703 (1997).
275. This is particularly so because the Board has ruled that the detainee bears the burden of
proof in a bond hearing. See Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 38 (BIA 2006); see also Holper,
Beast of Burden, supra note 20.
276. See Abira Ashfaq, We Have Given Them This Power: Reflections of an Immigration
Attorney, NEW POLITICS 66, 67 (Summer 2004); see also Gilman, supra note 20, at 175 (critiquing
immigration bond hearings because they begin with a default presumption of detention instead of
liberty).
277. See Emily Ryo, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 237, 239–40 (2019);
Mark Noferi, Mandatory Immigration Detention for U.S. Crimes: The Noncitizen Presumption of
Dangerousness, in IMMIGRATION DETENTION, RISK AND HUMAN RIGHTS: STUDIES ON
IMMIGRATION AND CRIME 217 (Maria João Guia, Robert Koulish & Valsamis Mitsilegas eds.,
2016); Margaret H. Taylor, Symbolic Detention, 20 DEF. ALIEN 153, 154–55 (1997).
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peril, or at the risk of being overruled by a law enforcement official. 278 It is
unsurprising, therefore, when an immigration judge chooses a bond outcome
that favors detention over freedom.
III. PROPOSAL
The involvement of federal judges described in Part II has only come
when a detainee is savvy enough to file a habeas corpus petition pro se, or
lucky enough to have counsel who would bring the custody decision to an
Article III court. What would the world of immigration detention look like
if all of those custody decisions went straight to federal district court, with
federal magistrate judges deciding whether a detainee should remain in
detention during their removal proceedings? Is it possible to dream up a
world where imitation judges have no role to play in deciding detention
matters, and only decide removability and relief from removal?
In this Part, I propose legislation that brings every immigration detainee
before a federal district court for a review of detention. More concretely, I
propose that magistrate judges, with review by Article III district judges,
conduct custody hearings using the procedures of the Bail Reform Act.
Before describing the proposed procedures, I start with a theoretical defense
of this proposal.
A. Detention is Different
To put the theoretical defense of this proposal simply, detention is
different from other decisions that immigration judges currently make.
Several scholars have argued that immigration detention itself should be
viewed as punishment, regardless of whether the removal proceedings are
deemed civil.279 Jonathan Simon describes how the new migrants arriving in
the 1980s were deemed “nonwhite by United States racial stereotypes;” the
Mariel Cubans were “viciously and largely inaccurately stamped from the
start with the stigma of dangerousness” and the Haitians were
“overwhelmingly black and mostly poor,” with the added stigma of carrying
AIDS.280 The government’s response to the arrival of masses of dangerous,

278. See supra Part I.
279. See, e.g., García Hernández, supra note 18, at 1352 (“Immigration imprisonment has, in
essence, taken on the same legal character as the immigration process and outcome that justify its
existence: It is civil confinement because it is part of a civil proceeding to determine whether a civil
sanction will be meted out.”). García Hernández has also written that immigration detention should
be abolished, because in its current state it is morally indefensible due to the high number of people
of color in detention. César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Abolishing Immigration Prisons, 97
B.U. L. REV. 245, 251, 270 (2017).
280. Simon, supra note 163, at 590–600.
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dependent, and possibly disease-carrying migrants was social control through
detention.281 César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández argues that Congress had
a punitive purpose in the expansion and use of immigration detention, which
coincided with the War on Drugs in the 1980s; the legislative intent behind
immigration detention was to stigmatize and penalize those who engage in
drug activity. 282 Because the new, nonwhite migrants were stereotyped as
drug dealers, the governmental response was incapacitation through
detention.283 Daniel Wilsher describes how “[d]etention has increasingly
become unstuck from its ostensible function of selecting who to admit or
enforcing the speedy and efficient physical return of unwanted immigrants”
and now has “mutated into a more general form of executive and political
control over unauthorized aliens.”284 Emily Ryo’s empirical work has
studied the role of immigration judges in deciding bond, where the goal of
protecting the public “implicates one of the primary objectives of criminal
punishment—incapacitation.”285 She has also studied immigrant detainees’
perceptions of the system and found a central belief that immigration
detention is an act of penal confinement, not “civil,” as it has been
classified.286
Because immigration detention is punishment, there are two possible
solutions: (1) entrench it in criminal procedure; or (2) distance it from its
punitive past, thus rendering it a truly “civil” detention system, where
detention is the exception and not the norm.287 The additional procedural
protections in bond hearings are coming slowly but surely, thanks to Article
III courts’ involvement.288 But there is more that can be done, and I propose
281. See id. at 600–04.
282. García Hernández, supra note 18, at 1350.
283. See id. at 1360.
284. Wilsher, supra note 18, at xxii–xxiii; see also Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation
Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1506 (2011) (describing how the criminal and immigration detention
systems are significantly merged, how the lengths of immigration detention have become prolonged,
and how the detention often takes place in the same facilities, so that “the distinction between the
two forms of incarceration may depend for the most part on the intention of the government”).
285. Emily Ryo, Detained: A Study of Immigration Bond Hearings, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 117,
119 (2016).
286. Emily Ryo, Fostering Legal Cynicism through Immigration Detention, 90 S. CAL. L. REV.
999, 1024–25 (2017).
287. García Hernández, supra note 18, at 1350–51; see also Mark Noferi, Making Civil
Immigration Detention “Civil,” and Examining the Emerging U.S. Civil Detention Paradigm, 27 J.
CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 533, 533–34 (2014) (offering prescriptive framework for a “‘truly civil’
immigration detention” system, which includes a comparison to the civil commitment of sex
offenders).
288. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017); Abdi v. Nielson, 287
F. Supp. 3d 327, 338 (W.D.N.Y. 2018); Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F. Supp. 3d 684, 692 (D.
Mass 2018).

1120

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:1076

as a solution for every immigration detainee a bail hearing conducted by a
magistrate judge whose judgment is subject to review by a district court
judge. Since immigration detention is punishment, and the United States
values and the Constitution protects the physical liberty of a human being,
our laws should assign these decisions to an independent judge.
Scholars such as Alex Aleinikoff and Lenni Benson have proposed that
Congress restore meaningful judicial review of ordinary detention decisions
and discretion to immigration judges in detention decisions.289 While
restoring federal court review of discretionary detention decisions would be
beneficial, relying on habeas corpus review is insufficient to challenge the
federal government’s overuse of immigration detention.290 Giving discretion
to immigration judges does little to fix the immigration detention system,
when such judges cannot exercise their judgment in a truly independent
manner.291 As Denise Gilman writes, “[r]eview of detention decisions by an
independent authority is a critical safeguard of liberty.”292
The problem of immigration judges lacking independence and yet
making these key liberty decisions is similar to elected judges deciding bail
in the pretrial criminal detention context.293 Elected state court judges are
likely to err on the side of denying bail or setting high bail because they are
“wary of bearing public responsibility for crimes that go unpunished—and
new crimes that are committed—because of an erroneous decision to release
defendants prior to trial.”294 In contrast, there is very little in the form of
public accolades for releasing a defendant who does not commit any crimes
and attends all hearings.295 Like immigration judges, state court judges risk

289. Benson, supra note 257, at 54 (arguing that the “best and most long lasting changes would
of course, come from Congress limiting the use of detention and putting strict, clear controls on the
agency authority to use detention” and that “Congress should restore discretion in the detention
decisions and allow both immigration judges and the federal courts to test and review detention
decisions”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 366 (2002) (“Zadvydas, for all its Warren Court-like
rulemaking, takes no steps toward ensuring what is most needed in the immigration detention
system: meaningful judicial review of ordinary detention decisions.”); see also Silva, supra note 20,
at 262–63 (arguing for de novo review of immigration detention decisions by a federal court).
290. See infra Part III.D.
291. See supra Part I.
292. Gilman, supra note 20, at 188 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987)).
See also Silva, supra note 20, at 262–64 (discussing immigration judges’ lack of independence as a
reason why federal courts should engage in de novo review of immigration detention decisions).
293. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 422 (2016).
294. Id. Wiseman also writes that elected judges may additionally “face pressure from a locally
powerful bail lobby” to set high bails. Id. This critique may apply to immigration judges, although
the policies described in Part I.B., supra, err on the side of no bond and thus would not favor any
immigration bond companies.
295. Id. at 428.

2021]TAKING LIBERTY DECISIONS AWAY FROM “IMITATION” JUDGES 1121
losing their jobs if they rule too often in favor of release.296 This has caused
scholars to propose alternatives to such highly discretionary decision-making
about liberty by a non-independent judge.297
For decades, scholars, congressional committees, practicing lawyers,
and judges have argued that administrative law judges or an Article I court
should decide immigration cases.298 Yet I argue that for detention decisions,
this fix simply does not go far enough. ALJs, although more protected from
removal than immigration judges, still do not have structural
independence;299 they cannot, after all, overrule a decision by the executive
branch.300 Their relative independence has even been called into question by
a 2018 Executive Order regarding the terms of their employment,301 and a
leaked Solicitor General memorandum defining “good cause” for removal to
include failure to “perform adequately or to follow agency policies,
procedures, or instructions.”302 Article I courts have suffered similar
296. See id. at 428–29.
297. See, e.g., id. at 443–77 (proposing use of actuarial risk assessment tools instead of judicial
discretion in bail decisions); Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention,
Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1297, 1363–66 (2012) (proposing
a “bail jury” to advise judges in making pretrial decisions); Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre,
Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 554–55 (2012) (exploring criteria that would more
accurately predict defendant dangerousness and suggesting that counties implement these models
to guide judges); Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959,
995–96 (1965) (proposing elimination of money bail).
298. See supra note 4.
299. James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1191, 1211 (2006). Moliterno discusses how administrative law judges are meant to be
impartial (fair-minded, neutral in their decision making), but not structurally independent in the
same way as an Article III court. Id. at 1200–20.
300. Id. at 1209; see also Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco—A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57,
61–62 (1979).
301. In response to the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Lucia v. SEC, a July 2018 Executive
Order changed the appointments process for ALJs, whose appointment processes will now be
controlled by agency heads, instead of the less political Office of Personnel Management. Exec.
Order No. 13,843, Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive Service, 83 Fed. Reg.
32,755 (July 10, 2018). Critics have raised concerns that this will lead to more political hiring of
ALJs, reflecting the same concerns over political hiring for immigration judges. Eric Yoder, Trump
Moves to Shield Administrative Law Judge Decisions in Wake of High Court Ruling, WASH. POST
(July
10,
2018
5:50
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/
2018/07/10/trump-moves-to-shield-administrative-law-judge-decisions-in-wake-of-high-courtruling/?utm_term=.8a195a289e49; Tal Kopan, Immigration Judge Applicant Says Trump
Administration Blocked Her over Politics, CNN POLITICS (June 21, 2018, 10:40 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/21/politics/immigration-judge-applicant-says-trumpadministration-blocked-her-over-politics/index.html. The Biden administration has continued this
Trump administration policy, facilitating the political hiring and firing of ALJs. See Davidson,
supra note 78.
302. Memorandum from Solicitor General to Agency General Counsels on Guidance on
Administrative Law Judges after Lucia v. SEC 9, https://static.reuters.com/
resources/media/editorial/20180723/ALJ—SGMEMO.pdf. As Paul Verkuil has noted, the Solicitor
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critiques about their independence.303 Also, Article I courts are subject to the
“Darwinian process by which agencies compete for funding.” 304 An
independent immigration adjudicative agency would likely fare much worse
in obtaining funding than other similar agencies that deal with more popular
causes such as veteran’s benefits or tax adjudication.305
B. Adopting the Bail Reform Act Procedures
To envision what these procedures would look like, one need not assign
a brand new task to Article III courts. Rather, magistrate judges already
regularly decide whether a detainee with pending criminal charges is a danger
or flight risk—which is the same inquiry immigration judges undertake when
deciding bond. The procedures for such hearings in federal court, however,
are considerably more protective of a pretrial detainee’s rights than the
current procedures provided by the immigration statutes and regulations.306
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 (“BRA”)307 created a procedure whereby
prosecutors can ask for detention hearings when the case involves certain
crimes that indicate a defendant’s dangerousness, even though the defendant
has yet to be tried for that offense.308 The 1984 BRA also created rebuttable
General’s memo expresses only litigation positions; however, the Executive Order took legal
actions to “dramatically expand executive control over administrative adjudicators.”). Paul R.
Verkuil, Presidential Administration, the Appointment of ALJs and the Future of For Cause
Protection,
CSAS
Working
Paper
20-07,
at
3
(Feb.
6,
2020),
https://administrativestate.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2020/02/Verkuil-PresidentialAdministration-the-Appointment-of-ALJs.pdf.
303. See Family, supra note 105, at 549–50 (summarizing scholarly critiques of independence
of Article I courts such as the Tax Court and Veterans Court).
304. Russell R. Wheeler, Practical Impediments to Structural Reform and the Promise of Third
Branch Analytic Methods: A Reply to Professors Baum and Legomsky, 59 DUKE L.J. 1847, 1853
(2010).
305. Id. at 1854; AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N IMMIGR., supra note 4, at 6–7.
306. See Gilman, supra note 20, at 190–95 (comparing pretrial detention and immigration
custody redetermination procedures); Cole, supra note 20, at 719–20 (recommending that Congress
adopt procedures similar to the Bail Reform Act for immigration detainees); Matter of De La Cruz,
20 I. & N. Dec. 346, 352–61 (B.I.A. 1991) (Heilman, Board Member, dissenting) (interpreting the
former immigration detention statute governing bond hearings for those convicted of certain crimes
and advocating for the Board to interpret the provision in accordance with the Bail Reform Act
because of the parallels in the statutory language).
307. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3141–3151).
308. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 21–22, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.3182,
3204–05. There were previous versions of the BRA that permitted such a hearing after a conviction,
while the defendant was appealing the case. The 1984 BRA was the first federal statute to permit
pretrial detention based on dangerousness. See Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention:
Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 376–77 (1970). It was
modeled after the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedures Act of 1970. See
id. at 371 n.1. Scholars disputed how closely the BRA tracked the D.C. statute because the BRA
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presumptions of dangerousness when defendants are charged with certain
enumerated crimes,309 effectively shifting the burden of production from the
government to the defendant.310 The judicial officer (typically a magistrate
judge)311 must determine whether the defendant is a danger to the community
or flight risk, and whether any condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant at trial or the safety of the
community.312 Either party can request de novo review by a district court
judge,313 and can appeal the decision to the court of appeals in their respective
circuit.314 As described by the Supreme Court, which upheld the BRA against
a constitutional challenge,315 “[i]n a full-blown adversary hearing, the
Government must convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing
evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or any person.”316
Asking a magistrate judge to assess danger to the community is no
different than an immigration judge deciding dangerousness in a bond
hearing. Flight risk may be different.317 Yet, when one considers the way
immigration judges currently assess flight risk,318 the myriad factors bear a
had fewer procedural protections. Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and
Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335, 347 (1990).
309. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3). The rebuttable presumptions have been amended over the years to
include several offenses; today, offenses involving drug trafficking, terrorism, carrying a firearm in
the commission of a crime of violence, and offenses involving minor victims (from sexual abuse to
offenses involving child pornography) all create the rebuttable presumption of dangerousness. Id.
310. See, e.g., United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 380–81 (1st Cir. 1985), abrogated, United
States v. O’Brien, 895 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1990) (in construing the BRA of 1984, determining that
“Congress did not intend to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant but intended to impose
only a burden of production”); United States v. Diaz, 777 F.2d 1236, 1237 (7th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Carbone, 793 F.2d 559, 560
(3d Cir. 1986).
311. See PETER G. MCCABE, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGES SYSTEM 27–28
(updated Oct. 2016), https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/FBA-White-Paper2016-pdf-2.pdf (describing magistrates’ duties, which include presiding over bail and detention
hearings).
312. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3).
313. 18 U.S.C. § 3145.
314. The review of the district court’s decision is de novo, giving deference to the district court’s
determination. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 895 F.2d 810, 816 (1st Cir. 1990).
315. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987).
316. Id. at 750 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). The Court held that the procedural protections
available under the BRA “are specifically designed to further the accuracy of that determination.”
Id. at 751. These procedures included the rights to court-appointed counsel, present witnesses,
cross-examine the government’s witnesses, written findings of fact, immediate appellate review,
and the enumeration of several statutory factors that the judicial officer must consider. Id. at 751–
52.
317. See Holper, Beast of Burden, supra note 20, at 127.
318. See Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006) (instructing immigration judges
in bond hearings to consider fixed address, length of residence, family ties, employment history,
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striking resemblance to the factors used in criminal cases.319 With respect to
the availability of relief from removal, magistrate judges would be asked to
opine on whether a detainee presents a prima facie asylum case, for
example.320 While this might seem like a daunting task, it is similar to the
inquiry that federal courts already make when a detainee argues that
prolonged mandatory detention is unconstitutional; courts there regularly
evaluate whether the detainee is likely to be ordered removed.321 Also, most
immigration judges likely do not have time to engage with the merits of relief
in bond hearings, given that the purpose of a bond hearing is not to evaluate
the merits of the case.322 Indeed, the Immigration Judge Benchbook, which
was in use for several years, does not even list relief from removal as one of
the flight risk factors.323
What about decisions on whether someone is subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)? Under the BRA, a magistrate judge
relies on the fact of an indictment for one of the enumerated crimes to allow
record of appearance in court, criminal record, history of immigration violations, attempts to flee
authorities, manner of entry into the United States, and possibility of success on the merits of
application for relief).
319. Denise Gilman has detailed how immigration bond determinations have borrowed heavily
from pretrial bail law, which she refers to as “selective borrowing” because the procedural
protections of the pretrial bail system do not apply, and the criminal custody system is moving away
from a system that is overly focused on money bonds. Gilman, supra note 20, at 195–203; see also
id. at 201 (“[I]t is as if news of these developments [(eliminating the use of money bonds in the
criminal pretrial detention context)] has not even reached the immigration detention system,
although many of the same problems with monetary bond identified in the criminal pretrial system
apply in immigration cases.”).
320. See Chase, supra note 126 (observing, from the view point of a former immigration judge,
that the important inquiry for flight risk is not whether the applicant will win the case, but whether
the applicant has a strong enough case that they will have an incentive to return to court).
321. See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 500 (1st Cir. 2016); Portillo v. Hott, 322 F. Supp.
3d 698, 707 (E.D.Va. 2018).
322. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) (2020) (providing that bond hearings and removal hearings are
separate); In re Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1126 (BIA 1999) (Rosenberg, Board Member,
concurring and dissenting) (“The underlying purpose of [8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d)] is not to limit the
information an Immigration Judge may consider in redetermining bond, but to ensure that evidence
presented in the far more informal bond hearing does not taint the ultimate adjudication of the
charges of removability.”); Ashfaq, supra note 276, at 67 (recounting a story of an immigration
judge who critiqued a detainee’s attorney for taking too much time developing the record for the
merits hearing during a bond hearing).
323. See CHARLES A. WIEGAND, IMMIGRATION JUDGE BENCHBOOK: FUNDAMENTALS OF
IMMIGRATION LAW, BOND AND CUSTODY HEARINGS 15–16, https://www.justice.gov/
eoir/archived-resources (listing as significant factors in bond determinations: fixed address, length
of residence in the United States, family ties, particularly those that can confer immigration status,
employment history, immigration history, attempts to evade authorities, prior court appearances,
and criminal record). Although the Benchbook is archived as of 2017 and no longer updated, it is
an example of how immigration judges were instructed for many years to conduct bond hearings.
See Matthew Hoppock, Here is the Current Immigration Judge Bench Book (Sort Of) (July 3, 2017),
https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/immigration-judge-bench-book/.
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a prosecutor to present dangerousness arguments;324 otherwise, only the
traditional bail assessment of flight risk may be considered.325 As part of my
proposal, I join the chorus of scholars critiquing the mandatory detention
statute and believe that any pretrial detention should involve a judge
reviewing the individual facts of a detainee’s case to determine whether
detention is necessary to further a compelling government interest, such as
protecting the community or ensuring that a detainee will not flee.326
Yet Congress need not entirely jettison 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); instead, it
can convert the enumerated offenses of Section 1226(c) into bases under
which an immigration prosecutor could request a dangerousness hearing, as
in the criminal pretrial detention context.327 It would then be necessary for
Congress to evaluate which offenses truly render a person presumptively
dangerous and thus subject to a detention hearing.328 It would also be
necessary to remedy who is reviewing such charging decisions for probable
cause, involving a magistrate judge in that decision as well329 because in the
immigration detention system, a finding that a person is deportable for one
of the criminal grounds of deportability is made by an immigration judge.
Finally, such a probable cause determination would have to be made
expeditiously, as the immigration system currently has no requirement that a
neutral magistrate promptly review the charge for probable cause in order to
continue pretrial detention.330
324. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3).
325. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (“Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing of
bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring
the presence of that defendant.”).
326. See, e.g., Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention,
45 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 601, 604 (2010) (arguing that the current framework
for mandatory detention is unfair and inefficient); Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous by Decree:
Detention Without Bond in Immigration Proceedings, 50 LOY. L. REV. 149, 150 (2004); Cole, supra
note 84, at 1006–07; Stephen H. Legomsky, The Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules, and
Discretion, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 531, 535 (1999).
327. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3).
328. Margaret Taylor has argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) involved none of the careful
Congressional study and deliberation that the Supreme Court in Demore attributed to it. See Taylor,
supra note 206, at 343. Today, many would agree that the categories of presumptive dangerousness
in both 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and the BRA stemmed from of the War on Drugs and “Severity
Revolution,” and should be reevaluated. See, e.g., García Hernández, supra note 18, at 1360; Teresa
Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 109–11 (2005); Jonathan Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining
America’s Severity Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 217, 219 (2001); Joseph E. Kennedy,
Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J.
829, 832–33 (2000).
329. See Holper, supra note 4, at 1277.
330. See, e.g., Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 55–56 (1991); Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975); see also Kagan, supra note 20, at 133 (arguing that immigration detainees
have a right under the Fourth Amendment to receive prompt review of charges of immigration law
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To more closely track the BRA procedures, immigration detainees
would require court-appointed counsel in their custody hearings.331 Scholars
already have proposed the right to court-appointed counsel for immigration
detention matters, arguing that the due process concerns in detention are great
enough to merit government-paid counsel for at least the detention decisions
that are made in immigration court.332 In an empirical study of bond hearings,
Emily Ryo found that representation by an attorney was one important factor
that led an immigration judge to grant bond. 333 It also is often overlooked
that federal courts may appoint (and pay) counsel for indigent civil detainees;
this is a practice that federal courts have employed in immigration habeas
corpus petitions.334
C. A Practical Defense
There are also practical reasons for why this Article’s proposal would
prove workable. For one, taking detention decisions from immigration
judges would allow these judges to work on the over one million cases that
are currently pending.335 Immigration judges are critiqued for carrying out a

violations by a neutral judge, and assuming for the purpose of the article that immigration judges
provide such a neutral judge); Holper, supra note 4, at 1283 (arguing that immigration detainees’
Fourth Amendment rights are regularly violated because the system provides no review by a truly
neutral judge, since immigration judges are not truly “neutral” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment).
331. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987).
332. See Noferi, supra note 20, at 68 (arguing for a limited right to court-appointed counsel for
“Joseph” hearings, in which it an immigration judge determines whether the detainee is properly
included within a mandatory detention category); see also In re Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800
(BIA 1999) (affirming that a mandatory detainee can seek review by an immigration judge about
whether they are properly included in a mandatory detention category, and citing 8 C.F.R. §
1003.19(h)(2)(ii) as the source of this authority); Cole, supra note 20, at 720–21 (arguing that the
liberty interest is so important that the Government should provide court-appointed counsel for
immigration detainees in custody hearings).
333. See Ryo, supra note 285, at 119. The other factor was the existence of a criminal record,
which made it less likely that a detainee would be granted bond. Id. at 146. Ryo suggests that—
beyond the complexity of immigration law that attorneys can navigate on behalf of detainees—
attorneys are “repeat players” who can negotiate with prosecutors ahead of time on a bond amount
that the judge will accept. Id. at 145. Alternatively, the judge might see a detainee as more invested
in the process if represented by a lawyer, or the judge could see the detainee as a “worthy opponent”
if represented. Id. at 145–46.
334. See Docket Entry No. 24, Figueroa v. McDonald, Civ. No. 18-10097-PBS (D. Mass 2018)
(appointing pro bono counsel); Docket Entry No, 22, Doe v. Smith, Case No. 17-cv-11231-LTS (D.
Mass 2017) (appointing pro bono counsel).
335. See TRAC, Immigration Court Backlog Surpasses One Million Cases (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/536/ (describing a historically high backlog of 768,257
cases in immigration courts nationwide, to which the Attorney General added 330,211 cases that
had been administratively closed by taking them off of the administratively closed docket).
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“deportation railroad.”336 This proposal gives each judge more time to
carefully consider the merits of each immigration case without having to
consider bond for the detainee. Immigration judges would be left to decide
the issues in which they have more expertise, such as removability and relief
from removal.337 The issues in which they have no particular expertise—
whether a person presents a danger to the community or is a flight risk—can
be left to the magistrate judges who already make those decisions in the
criminal pretrial detention context.338
This proposal naturally flows from the procedural mechanisms that
already have segregated the detention decision from the other decisions in a
removal case. For example, a regulation requires that bond hearings be
separate and apart from the removal case.339 The purpose of this regulation
is “to ensure that evidence presented in the far more informal bond hearing
does not taint the ultimate adjudication of the charges of removability.”340
Another regulation permits attorneys to represent clients in bond hearings;
the same attorney need not commit to representation in the removal case.341
The purpose of this regulation is to ensure better access to counsel for
detainees, at least in their bond hearings, since attorneys can limit their
representation to just bond hearings.342
336. See Remarks by Paul Wickham Schmidt to Louisiana State Bar Immigration Conference,
New Orleans, LA (Apr. 26, 2019), https://immigrationcourtside.com/2019/04/29/read-my-speechto-the-louisiana-state-bar-immigration-conference-in-new-orleans-on-april-26-2019-goodlitigating-in-a-bad-system/.
337. See, e.g., Mosquera-Perez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 3 F.3d 553, 555 (1st Cir.
1993) (reasoning that a court is required to give deference to the Board’s interpretation of ambiguous
language in the INA unless the interpretation is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute” and giving deference to the Board’s interpretation of statute that barred relief from removal)
(citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984)).
338. Cf. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2417 (2019) (reasoning that in order for an agency’s
interpretation of its regulation to receive deference, the interpretation must implicate the agency’s
“substantive expertise,” and that “[s]ome interpretive issues may fall more naturally into a judge’s
bailiwick”); Tod v. Waldman, 266 U.S. 113, 119 (1924) (reasoning that questions of citizenship of
the petitioner are appropriate for the district court because citizenship is “a question of frequent
judicial inquiry,” whereas for “technical” questions regarding the public charge ground of
inadmissibility, “[t]he [district] court is not as well qualified in such cases to consider and decide
the issues as the immigration authorities.”).
339. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d).
340. In re Adeniji, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1102, 1126 (BIA 1999) (Rosenberg, Board Member,
concurring and dissenting).
341. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17.
342. EXEC. OFF. IMMIGR. REV., DEP’T JUSTICE, Final Rule, Separate Representation for
Custody and Bond Proceedings, to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003, 3 (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/772051/download (“Permitting such separate appearances is
expected to encourage more attorneys and accredited representatives to agree to represent
individuals who would otherwise appear pro se at their custody and bond proceedings, which, in
turn, will benefit the public by increasing the efficiency of the Immigration Courts.”).
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There are, of course, practical drawbacks to such a proposal. Practicing
immigration lawyers, DHS trial attorneys, and judges all benefit from the
efficiency of having one time slot to resolve both the custody decision and
preliminary matters addressed at a typical master calendar hearing (taking
pleadings and applications, scheduling future hearings, and resolving issues
of removability). Although the bond hearing is technically separate and apart
from the removal hearing,343 these hearings often occur at the same time and
typically involve the same DHS trial attorney, respondent’s attorney, and
judge, with the only real separation being the record-keeping related to that
hearing.344 However, the gravity of the detention decision to all parties
involved merits special attention to that decision. As Justice Brennan stated,
“[t]here is no principle in the jurisprudence of fundamental rights which
permits constitutional limitations to be dispensed with merely because they
cannot be conveniently satisfied.”345 Also, as a practical matter, immigration
judges may begin hearing bond decisions on different days from the master
calendar hearing, simply because more procedures demand more of the
court’s time. Thus, the days where a request for bond could take place in a
matter of minutes may be over, as more immigration detainees complain of,
and win, a hearing where they truly have an opportunity to be heard.346
D. Why the Present Habeas Corpus Fix Does Not Suffice
The present system, in which federal courts review detention through
habeas corpus petitions, has significantly improved access to bond hearings
(for those subject to mandatory detention) and provided better procedures at
bond hearings for many detainees. While this system has benefited many
immigration detainees and is the result of much hard work by Article III
judges and litigators, it does not go far enough to remedy the systemic
problems described in this Article.
First, it is difficult to get in the door to federal court on a habeas corpus
challenge. An individual habeas corpus petition is time-consuming, and
detainees rarely have court-appointed counsel for such a legal battle.347 Even
343. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d).
344. Ashfaq, supra note 276, at 66.
345. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 575 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
346. See, e.g., Hechavarria v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 238–41 (W.D.N.Y. 2019)
(Hechavarria II) (describing a bond hearing that took place pursuant to the court’s order granting a
prolonged mandatory detainee a bond hearing, but finding that the immigration judge had not
applied the correct standard of proof in the hearing).
347. See Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 498 (1st Cir. 2016) (reasoning that filing a habeas
petition from immigration detention is “complicated and time-consuming, especially for aliens who
may not be represented by counsel”); see also Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study
of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (presenting results from
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for detainees who are fortunate enough to have counsel in their deportation
case, the attorney may choose not to spend time litigating the habeas
challenge when the detainee faces an expedited hearing on the merits of the
deportation case.348 Hours spent preparing a habeas petition are frequently
wasted, as federal district courts may not reach a decision on the merits of
the detention while the detainee is still fighting the deportation case, thus
rendering the habeas petition moot.349 An amicus curiae brief filed in the
Supreme Court in the Jennings case noted that, following Demore, habeas
corpus petitions challenging prolonged mandatory detention lasted a mean
time of nineteen months in the Eleventh Circuit, over seven-and-a-half
months in the First Circuit, and almost fourteen months in the Seventh
Circuit.350 An amicus brief filed in the First Circuit351 presented statistics

an empirical study of 1.2 million immigration removal cases over six years, which concluded that
detainees were five times less likely to obtain representation than nondetained respondents).
348. See Mary Holper, The Great Writ’s Elusive Promise, CRIMMIGRATION (Jan. 21, 2020, 4:00
AM), http://crimmigration.com/2020/01/21/the-great-writs-elusive-promise/; Mary Holper, The
Unreasonable Seizures of Shadow Deportations, 86 U. CINN. L. REV. 923, 943 (2018). Similarly,
in the early days of federal immigration enforcement in the United States, few immigration detainees
on the east coast brought habeas corpus challenges; their efforts and money were better spent on
challenging the underlying substantive immigration case. See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 17.
349. See Holper, The Great Writ’s Elusive Promise, supra note 348. For example, several habeas
corpus cases challenging the automatic stay regulation have been dismissed as moot because the
authority for the detention transferred before the habeas court could reach resolution of the issue.
See supra Part I.B. Some cases are dismissed because an appeal challenging the detainee’s custody
is still before the Board, which has jurisdiction to consider statutory challenges and discretionary
decisions regarding bond in an interlocutory appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(f). Although exhaustion
of administrative remedies is not statutorily required, habeas courts cite the doctrine of prudential
exhaustion to dismiss habeas petitions where legal challenges to detention are before the Board.
See, e.g., Maldonado-Velasquez v. Moniz, Case No. 1:16-cv-11890-RGS, Order Dismissing Case
(D. Mass. Nov. 8, 2016). The doctrine of prudential exhaustion should not apply, however, when
the habeas petition raises constitutional claims or the agency has predetermined the issue raised in
the petition such that exhausting the appeal before the agency would be futile. See, e.g., Khan v.
Atty. Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[D]ue process claims generally are exempt from
[the exhaustion requirement] because the BIA does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional
issues.”) (alterations in original); Figueroa v. McDonald, Civ. No. 18-10097-PBS, 2018 WL
2209217, at *3 (D. Mass. May 14, 2018) (holding that an appeal to the BIA of improper burden
allocation would be futile because the Board already had decided the issue in a published case, and
recognizing that the Board does not have jurisdiction to decide constitutional issues and therefore
any constitutional claims need not be exhausted).
350. Brief for Americans for Immigrant Justice, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 31, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (No. 15-1204), https://www.scotusblog.com/
wp-content/uploads/2016/10/15-1204_amicus_resp_americans_for_immigrant_justice.pdf.
351. In a case challenging the unlawful burden allocation that a detainee must bear in his
immigration bond hearing, the American Immigration Lawyers Association submitted an amicus
brief to encourage the court to reach the burden allocation argument, even though the District Court
had not reached the issue because it decided the detainee was not prejudiced by the burden
allocation. Maldonado-Velasquez v. Moniz, Case No. 17-1918, Brief of Amicus Curiae American
Immigration Lawyers Association in Support of Appellant and Reversal (filed Nov. 28, 2017).
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from the District of Massachusetts that showed it took an average of 130 days
to resolve a habeas petition, with some averaging 408 days; this length of
time operated to moot many petitions.352 Thus, although the current system
contemplates a role for Article III judges, their involvement comes too late,
or often not at all, to review the important legal questions that immigration
detention presents. As we see in many situations, the only successful
litigation challenges to immigration detention are for those whose detention
is so prolonged that the issues cannot go away. Examples of detainees whose
habeas petitions are less likely to become moot are those who are suffering
indefinite detention because their countries will not repatriate them,353 and
those who are suffering prolonged detention while they fight their cases
(although even in these cases, the litigation strategy only has proven
successful when courts extended the removal period to cover those who were
fighting their cases at the circuit courts).354 Otherwise, a prolonged detention
habeas petition becomes an invitation to the BIA to hurry up and resolve the
issues in the removal case, thus mooting out the habeas petition.355
Filing a habeas corpus petition puts the onus on the detainee—not the
government—to file the necessary paperwork to put their case in front of a
judge and to ensure that the legal arguments are properly raised and
briefed.356 No automatic review of the legality of the detainee’s custody
exists.357 In other civil detention contexts, courts have found that habeas

352. Ironically, one week prior to the scheduled oral argument in this case, the detention
challenge became moot by virtue of the detainee receiving a final order of removal from the BIA.
See Judgment, Maldonado-Velasquez v. Moniz, Case No. 17-1918 (Mar. 22, 2018).
353. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.678, 686, 702 (2001).
354. See, e.g., Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 947–48 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the statute governing detention during the removal period does not begin to govern
until a circuit court denies the petition for review and withdraws the stay of removal); Prieto-Romero
v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that while case is on appeal to a circuit
court, the detention is still governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the statute governing detention during
the removal proceedings, even if the stay of removal is not yet granted by the circuit court).
355. AM. IMMIGR. LAWS. ASS’N, Five-Part Webinar Series on Habeas Corpus, AILA Doc. No.
18031299 (June 5, 2018), https://www.aila.org/publications/videos/fearless-lawyering-videos/fivepart-webinar-series-on-habeas-corpus.
356. A good sample case to demonstrate the impact of how one frames the issue is Hamada v.
Gillen, 616 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass 2009). There,the District Court decided that the detainee was
merely challenging the judge’s discretionary bond denial, an issue over which the court had no
jurisdiction due to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e). Id. at 179. However, there certainly were legal defects the
detainee could have raised—notably, that he should not have borne the burden of proof, and that he
had a constitutional right to be transported to state criminal court to resolve his pending criminal
charge (which led the immigration judge to deny his bond). See Pensamiento v. McDonald, 315 F.
Supp. 3d 684, 686, 691–92.
357. See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 330–31 (recommending that even where habeas corpus is
available, immigration detention should be reviewed in an automatic fashion, and not be left to “the
vagaries of individual financial or practical circumstances”).
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corpus proceedings cannot be a substitute for regular hearings that the
government provides.358 Nor is there a mechanism in place whereby
government officials notify pro se detainees about their right to file a habeas
corpus petition—it is incumbent upon the detainee to figure out that such a
writ exists, where to file it, and what to say in the petition. The government
has only notified members of detention class actions, and even there the
notification is cryptic.359
While many detainees have achieved access to better bond procedures360
(or, in many cases, a bond hearing)361 through class actions, class actions
present their own challenges, given the 1996 statutes that purport to bar
injunctive relief on a classwide basis.362 While several courts have reasoned
that classwide holdings resting on statutory interpretations did not present a
bar to relief under the relevant statute,363 the Supreme Court in its 2018
Jennings decision questioned this method of resolving at least one set of
constitutional claims for a class of immigration detainees.364 The Court
remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit, requiring the court to analyze
the detainees’ claims under the Due Process Clause, and requiring that the
Ninth Circuit assess whether a class was the appropriate mechanism to
358. See, e.g., J.R. v. Hansen, 803 F.3d 1315, 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining that for
involuntary commitment of an intellectually disabled person, “[h]abeas can be at most a backstop—
a failsafe mechanism, not the sole process available.”); Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017, 1019, 1023
(9th Cir. 1981) (explaining that for involuntary commitment for mental health treatment, “[n]o
matter how elaborate and accurate the habeas corpus proceedings . . . may be once undertaken, their
protection is illusory when a large segment of the protected class cannot realistically be expected to
set the proceedings into motion in the first place.”).
359. In Massachusetts, for example, two class actions challenging immigration detention in 2019
resulted in District Court orders that permitted class members to file habeas corpus petitions. See
Holper, The Great Writ’s Elusive Promise, supra note 348. These class members received one
paragraph notices that they were class members. See Notice to Reid Class Member, Reid v. Donelan,
390 F. Supp. 3d 201 (D. Mass. 2019) (on file with author); Notice to Brito Class Member, Brito v.
Barr, 415 F. Supp. 3d 258 (D. Mass 2019) (on file with author).
360. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017); Abdi v. Nielsen, 287
F. Supp. 3d 327, 344–45 (W.D.N.Y. 2018); Brito v. Barr, 415 F. Supp. 3d 258, 271 (D. Mass 2019).
361. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2015); Lora v. Shanahan,
804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015), judgment vacated by Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S. Ct. 1260 (2018);
Reid v. Donelan, 22 F. Supp. 3d 84, 88–89, 93–94 (D. Mass. 2014), vacated, Nos. 14-1270, 141803, 14-1823, 2018 WL 4000993 (1st Cir. May 11, 2018).
362. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) (“Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity
of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have
jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part IV of this
subchapter [8 U.S.C. §§ 1221 et seq.], as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an
individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.”); see Jill E. Family,
Threats to the Future of the Immigration Class Action, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 71, 82–86 (2008).
363. See Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010); Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2003).
364. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 843–51 (2018).
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resolve the notoriously individualized due process claims.365 District courts,
post-Jennings, are currently grappling with what, if any, relief the Due
Process Clause should provide for classes of detainees whose mandatory
immigration detention without a bond hearing has become prolonged.366
Second, the current system does not allow a judge to review
discretionary bond decisions,367 so a number of cases are outside of the
judges’ jurisdiction. Federal courts often have reviewed the legality of
immigration detention decisions, notwithstanding Congress’ elimination of
judicial review over discretionary decisions made by immigration officials
regarding detention in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).368 Yet, Section 1226(e) requires
courts to grapple with the thorny question of what is and is not a discretionary
decision. The Supreme Court recently clarified that statutes barring judicial
review of discretionary immigration decisions do not bar review of the
application of law to settled facts.369 However, the notion of settled facts can

365. See id. at 851–52 (reasoning that “[d]ue process is flexible” so it “calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972))). On remand, the Ninth Circuit held that no statute bars class actions, and even if injunctive
relief is limited, a court could still provide classwide relief as declaratory relief. Rodriguez v. Marin,
909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018). The court then remanded to the District Court to decide the
constitutional issue and whether injunctive relief would be available to the class. Id. at 257; see
also Padilla v. ICE, 953 F.3d 1134, 1149–51 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated and remanded, ICE v. Padilla,
141 S. Ct. 1041 (2021) (discussing why the language and legislative history of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)
do not preclude classwide relief for a class of immigration detainees seeking access to bond hearings
and procedural protections at bond hearings).
366. See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 390 F. Supp. 3d 201, 227–28 (D. Mass. 2019) (denying classwide
relief in the form of automatic bond or “reasonableness hearings” before immigration judges at six
months of mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and requiring detainees challenging
prolonged mandatory detention to file individual habeas corpus petitions); Sajous v. Decker, No.
18-CV-2447 (AJN), 2018 WL 2357266, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018) (granting a preliminary
injunction to require a bond hearing for a class member and discussing that a motion for class
certification for those subject to prolonged mandatory detention is pending).
367. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).
368. See, e.g., Hechavarria II, 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 235–36 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (reviewing
whether an immigration judge applied the correct standard of proof at a bond hearing ordered by
the district court); Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140, 142–43 (D. Mass. 2019) (holding that
the court has jurisdiction to enforce its prior order granting a new bond hearing where the
government bore the burden of proof, and that the petitioner must show that either the immigration
judge did not place the burden on the government or that “‘the evidence itself could not—as a matter
of law—have supported’ the immigration judge’s decision to deny bond,” but that the district court
may not review the judge’s weighing of the evidence because of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (quoting
Hechavarria II, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 240)).
369. Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1071 (2020). Scholars had been exploring for
some years whether mixed questions of law and fact should be subject to judicial review in light of
the various immigration statutes intended to limit judicial review of discretionary decisions in
immigration law. See, e.g., Rebecca Sharpless, Fitting the Formula for Judicial Review: The LawFact Distinction in Immigration Law, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 57 (2010); Daniel
Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, and the “Rule” of Immigration
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be quite elusive when questions remain about what evidence immigration
judges may rely upon to determine such facts. For example, an immigration
judge’s decision to deny bond because the detainee is a danger often rests on
a police report from a dismissed or pending charge, or a report alleging gang
involvement.370 How much weight the immigration judge gives such reports,
which often include highly prejudicial hearsay,371 is exactly the type of
question federal courts are precluded from reviewing in light of 8 U.S.C. §
1226(e).372 In the words of Daniel Kanstroom, discretion becomes the place
where “complicated legal questions go to die.”373
Granting full jurisdiction to federal courts to decide custody issues is
somewhat similar to Congress’ response after courts routinely exercised
judicial review over immigration cases despite congressional attempts to
restrict judicial review. For example, Gerald Neuman has carefully outlined
the Supreme Court’s preservation of the habeas inquiry into the lawfulness
of exclusion and deportation orders in the face of congressional efforts
between 1891 and 1917 to confer finality upon those orders.374 Congress
responded by accepting the reality—federal courts would continue to review
deportation and exclusion orders—and writing such review into the

Law, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 161, 166–72 (2006); Kanstroom, supra note 274, at 710–11; Gerald
L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 611 (2006).
370. See, e.g., Rubio-Suarez v. Hodgson, No. 20-10491-PBS, 2020 WL 1905326, *2–*3 (D.
Mass. Apr. 17, 2020) (rejecting the detainee’s argument that police reports for pending cases cannot
prove dangerousness as a matter of law if the detainee did not object to the report during the bond
hearing); Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d. at 143 (reviewing an immigration judge’s decision to deny
bond because the government presented evidence that the detainee was a gang member, which led
the judge to find that the detainee was a danger).
371. See, e.g., Laila Hlass, The School to Deportation Pipeline, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 752–
53 (2018) (discussing highly unreliable hearsay contained in gang verification reports on which
immigration judges rely); Mary Holper, Confronting Cops in Immigration Court, 23 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 675, 675, 693–700 (2015) (discussing highly unreliable hearsay contained in police
reports on which immigration judges routinely rely).
372. See, e.g., Hachicho v. McAleenan, No. EDCV 19-820-VAP (KK), 2019 WL 5483414, at
*6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2019); Lopez Reyes v. Bonnar, 362 F. Supp. 3d 762, 772–73 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(holding that a district court “has jurisdiction to review [an] IJ’s discretionary bond denial” where
the denial “is challenged as legally erroneous or unconstitutional,” but courts “must be careful not
to encroach upon ‘the IJ’s discretionary weighing of the evidence’” (quoting Kharis v. Sessions,
No. 18-cv-04800-JST, 2018 WL 5809432, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018)).
373. See KANSTROOM, supra note 191, at 240. A good example of this is the Second Circuit’s
decision in Carcamo v. DOJ, in which a noncitizen disputed the contents of the police report, and
the court wrote that “‘talismanic invocation of the language of due process’ is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction on this Court” because “[d]ue process does not require that the IJ credit Carcamo’s
testimony over the evidence contained in the criminal complaint.” 498 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2007)
(quoting Saloum v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 437 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cir. 2006)).
374. See Neuman, supra note 43, at 989, 1007–17.
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immigration statute.375 Courts similarly responded to the 1996 efforts to
eliminate judicial review over several types of immigration decisions by
maintaining jurisdiction over questions of law and constitutional questions. 376
Congress again relented, amending the immigration statute to provide for
review of such questions through petitions for review in the circuit courts.377
Statutory codification of judicial intervention in immigration detention
cases also has historical precedent. For example, the earliest courts dealing
with those who could not be deported frequently held that indefinite detention
was unconstitutional.378 Congress responded in 1952 by legislating a judicial
role, granting the statutory right for a detainee to file a habeas corpus petition
in federal court upon a showing that the immigration authorities were not
acting with “reasonable dispatch” to either reach a deportation order or
effectuate that order.379
Third, some district courts have discussed the inefficiencies of sending
a case back to the immigration judge once the district court has decided a
habeas corpus petition.380 These cases came earlier in the challenges to
prolonged mandatory detention following the Demore decision,381 when
courts were still trying to sort out the scope of the Supreme Court’s decision.
Once bond hearings for those suffering prolonged mandatory detentions
375. See Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5, 75 Stat. 650, 651–53 (repealed 1996).
Kanstroom has described the 1961 reforms as “eliminat[ing] an entire layer of court review” that
habeas corpus review had previously provided. KANSTROOM, supra note 191, at 185; see also
Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial
Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1624 (2000) (“Congress thought that the combination of district
court review of the agency action and court of appeals review of the district court decision was
slower and more cumbersome than a one-stop review process in the court of appeals.”).
376. See, e.g., Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297–314 (2001)
(interpreting one provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) and three provisions of IIRIRA as not barring habeas corpus jurisdiction questions of
law and constitutional questions); Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 197–98 (1st Cir. 2003)
(interpreting sections of the Foreign Affairs Reform Restructuring Act, AEDPA, and IIRIRA as not
barring habeas corpus jurisdiction over questions of law and constitutional questions).
377. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, Title I, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (May 11,
2005) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which prohibits judicial review of most discretionary decisions
in removal cases, although courts may review constitutional questions and questions of law); see
also KANSTROOM, supra note 191, at 326 (referring to this provision as “a response to the St. Cyr
case”).
378. See WILSHER, supra note 18, at 33–34 (citing Saksagansky v. Weedin, 53 F.2d 13, 16 (9th
Cir. 1931); U.S. ex rel. Ross v. Wallis, 279 F. 401, 403–04 (2d Cir. 1922)).
379. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a), (c) (1952).
380. See, e.g., Flores-Powell v. Chadbourne, 677 F. Supp. 2d 455, 464 (D. Mass. 2010); Alli v.
Decker, 644 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541–42 (M.D. Pa. 2009), rev’d in part and vacated in part by Alli v.
Decker, 650 F.3d 1007 (3rd Cir. 2011).
381. Following Demore, several detainees challenged whether mandatory detention as applied
to their cases, where detention was prolonged, violated their Due Process rights. See, e.g., Sopo v.
Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1212–13 (11th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases).
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became a regular occurrence, courts may have been less willing to shoulder
the burden of so many bond hearings. Also, for the class actions that
succeeded in obtaining bond hearings once mandatory detention reached six
months, the remedy sought by class counsel was a bond hearing in
immigration court,382 so this effectively ended the practice of district court
judges holding their own bond hearings. However, there are still detainees
who bring their cases back to a district court after an unsuccessful bond
hearing that the district court ordered, effectively putting the custody issue
into federal court receivership.383 The inefficiencies noted by earlier district
courts might serve as a reminder to federal courts today: If you want
something done correctly, you have to do it yourself.384 The unworkability
of a case-by-case habeas approach is one reason why at least one federal
circuit court, deciding whether detainees whose mandatory detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) had become unreasonably prolonged, suggested that
Congress or the executive branch establish a set of procedures for either
federal courts or immigration judges to follow.385

382. See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 22 F. Supp. 3d 84, 93–94 (D. Mass. 2014), vacated, Reid v.
Donelan, Nos. 14-1270, 14-1803, 14-1823, 2018 WL 4000993 (1st Cir. May 11, 2018); Lora v.
Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015), judgment vacated by Shanahan v. Lora, 138 S. Ct.
1260 (2018) (upholding relief that required bond hearings before immigration court once mandatory
detention exceeded six months); Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d 1060, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2015), rev’d and
remanded by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (upholding relief that required bond
hearings before immigration court once mandatory detention exceeded six months).
383. See, e.g., Hechavarria II, 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 235–36 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (reviewing
whether an immigration judge applied the correct standard of proof at the bond hearing ordered by
the district court); Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d. 140, 142 (D. Mass. 2019) (reviewing
whether an immigration judge applied the correct standard of proof at the bond hearing ordered by
the district court); Enoh v. Sessions, No. 16-CV-85(LJV), 2017 WL 2080278, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. May
15, 2017) (reviewing whether an immigration judge applied the correct standard of proof at the bond
hearing ordered by the district court).
384. Cf. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671,
1685–86 (2007) (“[I]mmigration courts often must spend additional resources to revisit decisions
that have been overturned by appellate courts, and the appellate court opinions themselves can be
quite embarrassing to the agency (as many of Judge Posner’s are).”).
385. See Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 502 n.5 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Given the shortcomings of
case-by-case habeas review identified above, however, it would be appropriate for the executive (or
the legislature, as the case may be) to consider explicitly permitting detainees in the position of the
petitioner to seek a reasonableness review before a federal court or before an immigration judge
more familiar with the intricacies of the case and the particulars of the underlying removal
proceedings.”). On remand, the District Court in Reid v. Donelan allowed plaintiff class members
to amend the complaint to propose the alternative relief of a “reasonableness hearing before an
immigration judge” once mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) has become prolonged.
Reid v. Donelan, No. 13-30125-PBS, 2018 WL 5269992, at *4, *8 (D. Mass. Oct. 23, 2018). The
District Court ultimately did not grant this relief and held that detainees suffering prolonged
mandatory detention must file individual habeas corpus petitions. Reid v. Donelan, 390 F. Supp.
3d 201, 227–28 (D. Mass. 2019).
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Finally, while it is possible for habeas courts to continue to use their
equitable powers to hold their own bond hearings, this may not be the most
optimal long-term solution. Because it is not a legislative fix, it lacks the
necessary funds to support such an effort. It would be a shame if judges
deciding habeas corpus petitions and exercising equitable jurisdiction to hold
bond hearings found themselves in the same “habeas corpus mill” that
occurred in the late 1800s in San Francisco, drowning under the number of
immigration detainee cases to hear without adequate resources to help.386
Judges who wish to guard the American ideal of physical liberty for
immigration detainees should receive resources to adequately address their
caseloads. Also, Congress should more honestly look at how it allocates
money for immigration enforcement and adjudication.387 Congress should
move money away from the private prison industry that currently warehouses
immigration detainees388 and into a system that provides real adjudication of
each detainee’s right to liberty. Congress has unofficially passed the buck to
the judiciary to police immigration detention; 389 it is time to put detention
decisions squarely into the hands of federal courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Breyer, in his 2001 majority opinion in Zadvydas, cautioned
against immigration detention where “the sole procedural protections
available to the alien are found in administrative proceedings, where the alien
bears the burden of proving he is not dangerous, without (in the
Government’s view) significant later judicial review.”390 He wrote, “the
Constitution may well preclude granting ‘an administrative body the
unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental
386. See Fritz, supra note 158; SALYER, supra note 158, at 21 (discussing San Francisco federal
judge petitioning to Congress in January 1888 to pass more restrictive legislation, acting “primarily
out of their despair over their crushing caseload” in Chinese Exclusion Act cases).
387. See Sean McElwee, It’s Time to Abolish ICE: A Mass-Deportation Strike Force is
Incompatible with Democracy and Human Rights, NATION MAG. (March 9, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/its-time-to-abolish-ice/.
388. See, e.g., Claire Hansen, Biden’s Order Aiming to End Use of Private Prisons Excludes
Immigrant Detention Facilities, U.S. News (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.usnews.com/
news/national-news/articles/2021-01-26/bidens-order-aiming-to-end-use-of-private-prisonsexcludes-immigrant-detention-facilities; ALEINIKOFF & KERWIN, supra note 9, at 13 (proposing
that the Biden administration end the use of private corporations to administer immigration
detention centers); Gilman & Romero, supra note 10; see also Brownell, supra note 160, at 3
(discussing the DOJ’s policy of reducing detention and closing detention facilities, which “has
incidentally resulted in a considerable financial saving to the Government.”).
389. See Cox, supra note 384, at 1686 (“If federal courts are dedicating additional resources to
police the immigration courts, Congress might conclude that it is not worth investing its own energy
to restructure that system of adjudication.”).
390. 533 U.S. 678, 692 (2001).
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rights.’”391 The Zadvydas Court considered indefinite immigration detention
of those who could not be deported. Yet Justice Breyer’s instructive words
echoed those of Justice Black in 1952, who considered release on
immigration bond during deportation proceedings.392
These opinions are a half-century apart yet represent an equally
cautionary tale, telling Congress that an immigration detention system
wherein administrative officers make key decisions about the right to liberty
is unacceptable in the United States. It matters not whether Congress calls
the administrative decisionmaker a judge; in the immigration context, that
judge works for the nation’s top prosecutor and can easily be removed for
ruling against the government. Immigration judges’ independence has long
been under threat. The Trump administration took advantage of the systemic
flaws to break down any vestiges of immigration judges’ independence.
Congress therefore should prevent imitation judges from wielding the
extraordinary governmental power to take away physical liberty.

391. Id. (citing Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst. Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 450
(1985); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[U]nder certain
circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial process.”).
392. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 555 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I think that
condemning people to jail is a job for the judiciary in accordance with procedural ‘due process of
law.’ To farm out this responsibility to the police and prosecuting attorneys is a judicial abdication
in which I will have no part.”).

